Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2015

Deterring Nuclear Attacks on Japan: An
Examination of the U.S.-Japan Relationship and
Nuclear Modernization
Alyssa M. Minamide
Claremont McKenna College

Recommended Citation
Minamide, Alyssa M., "Deterring Nuclear Attacks on Japan: An Examination of the U.S.-Japan Relationship and Nuclear
Modernization" (2015). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 1165.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1165

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE

DETERRING NUCLEAR ATTACKS ON JAPAN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP AND NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

SUBMITTED TO

PROFESSOR JENNIFER TAW
AND
DEAN NICHOLAS WARNER
BY
ALYSSA MINAMIDE

FOR
SENIOR THESIS
SPRING 2015
APRIL 27, 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my reader, Professor Taw, for a wonderful four years of critical
thinking about international relations, doodle sessions, and cats. Professor Taw is one of
the most caring, supportive people I have met at CMC, though I know she hates
compliments. Her guidance will continue to inspire me as a strong, independent woman.
I would also like to thank my parents for teaching me the importance of self-motivation
and for being my cheerleaders through the highs and the lows. Their patience and
encouragement only provide further incentive for me to succeed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction……………………………………………………………………….. 1

II.

Extended Deterrence and the U.S. Superpower………………………………… 13

III.

Origins of the U.S.-Japan Alliance……………………………………………… 25

IV.

Shifts in the U.S.-Japan Alliance………………………………………………... 31

V.

The Alliance Today………………………………………………………………54

VI.

Evaluation of the Nuclear Deterrence Fulfillment………………………………. 71

VII.

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………. 78

VIII.

Works Cited……………………………………………………………………... 82

1
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 5, 2009, in the crowded Hradcany Square of Prague, U.S. President
Barack Obama delivered the most compelling speech on nuclear weapons in the last
decade. He described the nuclear arsenal’s Cold War legacy, the U.S. role as a leading
nuclear power, and the two main U.S. commitments for the future. The first commitment
was the aim to reach nuclear zero:
“I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security
of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naïve. This goal will not be reached quickly
– perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must
ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we
can’.”1

As leader of the only country in history to ever use nuclear weapons, and successor in a
line of presidents who very clearly voiced a pro-nuclear stance, Obama made a
monumental declaration. He then followed the statement with a backtracking effort to
prevent diplomatic panic:
“Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe,
secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our
allies – including the Czech Republic.”2

The U.S. has promised to defend allies all over the world with nuclear forces, and
consequently has been forced into a delicate and precarious position. Obama wants to
reach nuclear zero, which would make the world safe from nuclear destruction in the
future; yet he also wants to provide security for allied nations in the present, using the
very weapons he has marked for destruction. There are also potential problems of “rogue”
nuclear states that are unbound by any international treaty, non-state actors bent on
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nuclear terrorism, and the extremely difficult and essentially impossible task of
convincing the other nuclear states to simultaneously disarm.
In the midst of this debate is the U.S capacity to efficiently maintain and replace
the existing numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Amy Woolf, a Specialist
in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Congressional Research Service, states that during the
New START ratification process in 2010, the Obama Administration submitted a budget
of $210 billion, over a ten-year period from 2011 to 2021, in order to “maintain and
modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal”.3 The Administration supports a comprehensive
nuclear triad, and so does newly instated Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, though
both face difficult choices as conventional capacity updates take precedent over nuclear
ones and modernization plans look more and more implausible to fund.4 After all, an
investigation by the Congressional Budget Office in 2013 discovered that due to
complications of funding allocation between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy, as well as an omission of spending estimates for procuring future
generations of weapons and delivery systems, the budget would be closer to $355 billion
from 2011 to 2021.5 Some have argued that the nuclear triad is no longer necessary,
proposing alternative plans that eliminate one or two of the legs, while others call for
complete nuclear disarmament so the U.S. can set the precedent toward global nuclear
zero.6 In short, the U.S. is debating three major aspects of its nuclear triad: the physical
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totals of nuclear warheads and missiles; the proportions of its arsenal dedicated each leg
of the nuclear triad; and the overall cost it will take to complete modernization proposals.
With these circumstances in mind, how exactly does the U.S. create the minimal
“safe, secure, and effective [nuclear] arsenal”, which will intimidate all foes and protect
all allies? How well does the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal meet its foreign security
commitments? What triggers allies to respond to changes in U.S. nuclear policy? And
how well does the U.S. adapt its nuclear strategy to each allied country’s unique
geographical, political and cultural circumstances?
This paper connects these questions specifically to the U.S. security relationship
with Japan. While not as volatile as regions like the Middle East and Eastern Europe, the
East Asian region is full of its own unique tensions. Japan, one of America’s most
significant allies in that part of the world, is surrounded by potentially harmful nuclear
states, including China and North Korea. It has considered the potential to nuclearize in
the past, and it employs nuclear energy as a source of power. In lieu of Obama’s mission
toward nonproliferation and an eventual nuclear zero, it is essential that countries like
Japan are protected so they do not feel threatened enough to attain nuclear weapons of
their own. But how much do U.S. nuclear weapons really play a role in these security
commitments? Are they effective in strengthening the alliances? And if the role of
nuclear weapons is to be reduced in future U.S. nuclear policy, how will it affect the
response and interests of the alliance itself?
Chapter 1 will explain the concept of extended nuclear deterrence in the context
of the U.S., from the evolution of the first atomic bomb in the 1940s to the current arsenal.
This will relate to the specific factors influencing the decision to extend U.S. nuclear

4
deterrence beyond its own borders, as well as the major changes in the structure of the
force over the past century, and the most up to date status of the arsenal and its missile
systems.
Chapter 2 will discuss the initial U.S.-Japan security arrangement and the major
historical influences that have shaped the two countries’ relationship through modern
times. Emphasis will be placed on how the initial interests of both states manifested
themselves through nuclear security policy, from the development of the 1947 Japanese
Constitution to the establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine and the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles, on which the bilateral relationship is based.
Chapter 3 will examine three specific time periods in which the U.S.-Japan
security relationship experienced particularly heightened levels of tensions and
uncertainty with relation to the U.S. nuclear arsenal, in order to determine what types of
challenges the alliance faced and to assess the reactions of both parties in response to
these challenges. The analysis covers the circumstances surrounding the 1960s Chinese
nuclear tests; the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine under the supervision of
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; and the rise of the North Korean nuclear program in
the 1990s. All three of these sections will provide essential background as the focus of
the paper turns to modern day and the important changes that are occurring within the
Japanese and U.S. security paradigms.
Chapter 4 brings these historical background events into context with the present,
in order to understand how well the nuclear relationship between Japan and the U.S. is
faring today. Current negotiations and diplomatic strategies will be evaluated within the
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limits of the existing U.S. nuclear arsenal and posture, as well as the security-related
concerns held by both nations.
Chapter 5 will transition to the future plans for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, keeping
in mind the New START Treaty reductions, the changing security environment, and the
nuclear modernization proposals being discussed in Washington. Understanding these
changes is a requirement for determining how effectively the U.S. nuclear arsenal will
fulfill its security commitments with Japan. Given the historical and modern factors that
contribute to the development or regression of alliances, will there be more or fewer
bilateral crises in the future? Are there still triggers, such as those from previous periods
of tension, which could complicate the bilateral relationship?
With this paper, the author hopes to contribute a work of practicality and depth on
U.S.-Japan relations to further understanding of the stakes involved in nuclear deterrence,
not just for the U.S. protection of its own borders, but also for the protection of countries
around the world. South Korea and other major allies are also dependent on the
protection of U.S. nuclear weapons, and therefore pertain just as strongly to U.S. interests
and strategy throughout the process of modernizing and shifting the nuclear arsenal.
Discussing nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War age is still highly relevant, as these
weapons will be maintained in the arsenal, the budget, and the diplomatic relations of the
U.S., and make up an aspect of national security that has become a priority item in recent
U.S. policy discussions.
Definition of Deterrence
Deterrence is a term best understood when compared with defense, and can be
clearly illustrated through a Tolkienian lens. When Rohan is threatened by Saruman’s
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Uruk-hai, King Theodred of the horse nation moves his people to the fortified Helm’s
Deep, prepares his armies as best he can, and settles down to wait for the enemy to attack.
This is a defense strategy, because it is designed to repel the enemy once the attack
commences. On the other hand, in the hypothetical situation that Smaug the dragon were
still alive, in Rohan, and sworn to destroy all enemies of the horse nation, Theodred and
his people could have stayed where they were and convincingly threatened the Uruk-hai
that if they attacked, they would face fiery retribution, enough to wipe out the entire
Uruk-hai population. This move would force the enemy to forfeit the attack entirely,
exemplifying the strategy of deterrence. Schelling postulates that while defense strategy
is mainly concerned with an enemy’s physical strength, deterrence, or “the coercive use
of the power to hurt,” relies more heavily on an assessment of an enemy’s “wants or
fears,” in other words, enemy interests.7 This does not mean that deterrence entirely
neglects the opponent’s physical capabilities; rather, it strives to find targets that would
cause the enemy so much suffering that the thought of it overpowers the possible launch
of a physical offensive. Both defense and deterrence are aspects of U.S. joint security
policy with Japan, but this paper will look specifically at deterrence for protecting Japan
from external threats. Nuclear weapons, like Smaug the dragon, prioritize the prevention
of attacks by giving potential foes compelling reasons not to attack.
Literature on Deterrence and the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons
The field of deterrence theory is complex and, at times, even contradictory. This
section will briefly discuss pertinent academic assumptions about the requirements for
successful deterrence, and the uniqueness of nuclear deterrence compared to conventional
deterrence.
7
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Waltz outlines three specific parameters for the physical requirements of
deterrence. The first is that “a part of the force must appear to be able to survive an attack
and launch one of its own.”8 The second is that “survival of the force must not require
early firing in response to what may be false alarms.”9 Proponents of the full nuclear triad
argue that only with a stable system of nuclear submarines, bombers, and ICBMs can the
U.S. resist the temptation to “prompt launch,” a term describing the early firing of
nuclear weapons in response to potential false alarms. Waltz’s final parameter is similar
to the second in that “weapons must not be susceptible to accidental and unauthorized
use.”10 This requires a strong showing by the deterring country to demonstrate that its
nuclear weapons are being kept at the highest level of monitoring and care. The U.S.
failed this principle in August 2007, when Air Force workers accidentally loaded six live
nuclear warheads into a set of air-launched cruise missiles scheduled for retirement; the
B-52 bomber carrying the missiles had flown across the continental U.S. before the
mistake was realized.11 Huth sums these points up by suggesting that the success of
deterrence is determined by whether or not the potential attacker ends up using sustained
military force, and whether or not the defender capitulates to the demands of the potential
attacker.12 If no force is used and the defender has refused to yield, deterrence has
worked; if the attacker resorts to force or if the defender is coerced into agreeing with the
attacker’s terms to avoid war, deterrence has failed.
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Wohlstetter is more stringent and explicit than Waltz in describing the physical
stipulations for deterrent forces. Looking pragmatically at the situation, the number one
priority for deterrence goes not to survivability but to the stable operation of the force
during peacetime, particularly with feasible budgets and fail-safe mechanisms.13 This
advice was given in 1958, but it still has merit today, especially with the current
modernization plans for the U.S. arsenal. The argument goes that if a force can withstand
an enemy attack but is financially and technically inefficient in the long run, it needs to
be altered immediately in order to prevent long-term consequences, such as a higher
chance of accidents and unnecessary political tensions. After this hurdle, the next priority
is surviving attacks, followed by improving communication measures in the case of
retaliation, and creating a force with the accuracy and power to both defend against
aggressive advances and overcome enemy defenses to reach targets.14 Wohlstetter’s
analysis was limited by his concentration solely on the Soviet threat, and his work
predated the great strides in weapons technology that have occurred over the past fifty
years. However, his alignment of priorities is still important to consider when assessing
the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent force for Japan and South Korea.
Practicalities aside, there are some basic theoretical conditions needed to establish
a successful deterrent force. First, the enemy must understand exactly what will cause (or
prevent) the pain and destruction it desperately fears. According to Schelling, “the pain
and suffering have to appear contingent on his behavior.”15 If the U.S. wants to avert a
war with Russia, for example, it has to make clear to Russia that any decisive attack it
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makes will result in its own death and destruction, while no attacks will mean that
Russian lives and resources are saved. This leads to the other requirement for deterrence,
involving an overlapping of interests between states. In a hypothetical situation where
Russia’s sole interest was to destroy the U.S., and its only cause of suffering was a U.S.
victory, there would be no way to reach a proper deterrent solution, because any
compromise in which the U.S. is not destroyed would be a U.S. victory, which would
cause Russia pain and suffering. However, realistically this scenario is not the case, and
there are some general overlapping economic and political interests between the U.S. and
Russia, as well as other countries with tense relations. Therefore, deterrence is merely a
bargain, “arranging for [the opponent] to be better off doing what we want – worse off
not doing what we want – when he takes the threatened penalty into account.”16 With all
of this in consideration, the most important measure of a deterrent force’s success is that
its threats never actually come into fruition.
Jervis, while acknowledging the importance of deterrence theory from writers like
Wohlstetter, Waltz, and Schelling, provides additional insight from what is deemed the
“third wave” of deterrence theory. Jervis argues that these third-wave scholars take into
consideration five factors not included in earlier forms of the theory: 1) the paradox that
statesmen must face between taking more risks and forcing an enemy retreat, versus
taking fewer risks to make the situation safer; 2) the utility of rewards and positive
reinforcement when negotiating potentially violent circumstances with aggressive states;
3) the array of psychological factors that influence deterrence, including
misunderstandings of the opponent’s values, strategies, worldviews, and intentions; 4) the
problem of rationality and calculations in the context of statesmen’s decision making; and
16

Ibid.
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5) the complications of domestic and bureaucratic politics, from individual authorities to
large group interests.17 These observations establish a more nuanced approach to
deterrence theory, allowing analysts to examine more factors than merely a state on state
realist perspective. Rather than look only at how the billiard balls of deterrence interact
with each other, Jervis argues that what is going on inside the billiard balls matters just as
much.
Historically, deterrence was reinforced by conventional means, usually by large
armies using weapons from bows and arrows to swords and shields to guns and tanks.
These deterrence tools were capable of committing large-scale destruction, but they were
expensive to maintain in terms of lives and resources. The introduction of nuclear
weapons to the international battlefield changed this. When the atomic bomb dropped in
Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and thousands of people, the majority of them civilians,
were extinguished by one single weapon, a message was sent to the rest of the world that
humanity had reached a point at which it could completely destroy itself. This has led to
new meanings for deterrence, for as Schelling stated: “Deterrence rests today on the
threat of pain and extinction, not just on the military defeat.”18 With the touch of a button,
causing no harm to its own forces, a state could flatten its opponent.
Walzer interprets nuclear deterrence as “a kind of bluff;” after Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, no nuclear bombs have ever been dropped on a population as a strategy of war,
and as such nuclear weapons states have fallen into a pattern of “not only don’t we do
anything, we also don’t believe that we will ever have to do anything,” thus the common
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conception that nuclear deterrence works.19 Schelling also attributes this state of mind to
beliefs:
“If everybody believes, and expects to believe, that things get more dangerous when the
first nuclear weapon goes off, whatever his belief is based on he is going to be reluctant
to authorize nuclear weapons, will expect the other side to be reluctant, and in the event
nuclear weapons are used will be expectant about rapid escalation in a way that could
make escalation more likely.”20

This sort of thought process, in which nuclear deterrence works to prevent attacks from
enemy states but, if an attack occurs, will lead to rapid violent escalation, continues to
influence modern day assumptions concerning the use of nuclear weapons. These in turn
affect the strategies and modernization policies of nuclear weapons states, as well as the
attitudes of the non-nuclear weapons states that seek protection under extended
deterrence.
Allison et al. wrote an intriguing piece on the ways in which policymakers
address the issue of nuclear deterrence and the possibility of nuclear war. The authors
categorize policymaker attitudes into three distinct camps. Hawks, the first type, have the
motto of “peace through strength;” they are not afraid to take risks in order to appear
legitimate and unmoving toward state opponents, and they are highly supportive of
military might.21 Hawks see nuclear nonproliferation as a sign of weakness in the
international anarchic system. Doves support “reassurance and compromise,” taking a

19
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more diplomatic approach than that of the hawks.22 They view the maintenance of
military preparation and nuclear arms as undermining peaceful deterrence and are too
provoking compared to other tools such as non-military incentives, diplomatic
communication, and compromise as proper means of deterrence. While both doves and
hawks see war as being started deliberately, owls, the third category, worry about nuclear
crises arising from a loss of control over the situation.23 This fits Jervis’s concerns and
third-wave deterrence theorists, taking into consideration possible misperceptions of
intentions, accidents, irrationality, and bureaucratic complications that arise during times
of crisis. Owls, therefore, support deterrence policies that “avoid crises and increase
controls” in an attempt to prevent technical and human mistakes from starting a nuclear
war.24
As the next section will illustrate, all of these aspects and issues of deterrence
have influenced the U.S. development of nuclear strategy and unremittingly shaped the
various changes in nuclear policy over the years.

22
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24
Ibid.
23

13
II.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE U.S. SUPERPOWER

As the first country to develop nuclear weapons, the U.S. had to develop a
strategy for an entirely new category of warfare. As such, the focus of U.S. nuclear
strategy has been constantly evolving through time, based on a steep learning curve
through each phase of strategy, adjustments for significant technological advancement,
and the dynamics of domestic and foreign relations. Important to note is that extended
nuclear deterrence was not part of the plan when the atomic bomb was first conceived.
Former President Truman, who authorized the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stated
in a 1950 press conference that while he did not want to see the nuclear option being
used, it was under active consideration to be used in warfare, particularly in the conflict
on the Korean peninsula, and was “a matter that the military people will have to
decide.”25 Through a combination of steady progress in nuclear warhead and delivery
system technology, changing international norms discouraging the use of nuclear
weapons, a growing network of allies, and the nuclear proliferation of potential enemies,
the U.S. had to adjust its strategy to provide a nuclear deterrent for both itself and the
countries it pledged to protect. This chapter will follow the strategies that were
implemented in attempt to fulfill these duties, including massive retaliation, flexible
response, counterforce, lead but hedge, and new triad, while simultaneously discussing
the corresponding structural shifts of the physical arsenal itself. Analyzing these
strategies will facilitate an understanding of how U.S. policy strategies and attitudes
affect its extended deterrence capabilities and credibility. The chapter will then review
the current status of the arsenal in terms of warheads, missile systems, and overarching

25
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nuclear posture. This will show how the security situation today has evolved, and how
modern strategies need to take into account the restrictions of nuclear technological
advancements, due to international norms concerning the use of nuclear weapons, in
order to provide optimal deterrence for both the U.S. and its allies.
Setting the Stage: Early U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
Massive retaliation was one of the first strategies for U.S. nuclear weapons as a
means of deterrence. Set up in the mid-1950s under the Eisenhower administration,
massive retaliation refers to a hypothetical situation where if an aggressor state attacked
the U.S. or its allies, the U.S. would respond with an overwhelming display of force, not
necessarily proportionate to the level of attack. By the 1950s, the U.S. had already
established alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Nationalist government on
Taiwan. Then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles coined the term in a speech to the
Council of Foreign Relations in 1954, when he noted (to President Eisenhower’s
chagrin):
“We need allies and collective security. Our purpose is to make these relations more
effective, less costly… Local defense will always be important. But there is no local
defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local
defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A
potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit
him.”26

The policy move was a delayed response to the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test in
August 1949, during a period in which forces were first demobilized in the aftermath of
World War II and then remobilized with fears of the USSR. Eisenhower wanted a policy
that was both powerful and cost-cutting, because though nuclear weapons were
expensive, they were not as expensive as the thousands of soldiers that had been
26

John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Nuclear Files,
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deployed across the world for the War. It was also thought at the time that once the U.S.
had a substantial nuclear deterrent, it could scarcely be denied to its allies, and could in
fact be extended with relatively little extra cost.27 Eisenhower reinforced these principles
in his 1954 State of the Union address, where he affirmed the “paramount importance to
American security of maintaining good relations with its allies,” though he made no
explicit commitments to use the nuclear option.28 He did pledge to maintain a “massive
capability to strike back,” and emphasized navy and air force power as well as nuclear
weapons.29 As a preliminary nuclear strategy, massive retaliation fully embraced the
hawkish motto of “peace through strength,” and had little emphasis on dovish or owlish
tendencies, either for maintaining peace through non-violent means or focusing on
reducing nuclear accidents.
By the mid-1950s, the number of bomber aircraft and nuclear warheads in the
U.S. arsenal had increased dramatically. Nuclear bombers had increased from 15 in 1945
to 1,854 at their peak in 1959, while the number of nuclear warheads during the same
time period increased from 6 to 15,468.30 The promotion of massive retaliation brought
with it increased focus on the development of ICBMs, since the U.S. was not only
looking for maximum “atomic striking power” but was also concerned about a potential
“missile gap” in response to the first Soviet ICBM test in 1957. The U.S. sought to create
an arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons forces: strategic forces were aimed at
calculated targets including military facilities, nuclear missile bases, factories, and cities,
27
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while tactical forces were placed in preparation for direct use on the battlefield in the case
of war.31 Europe first began cooperating with the U.S. to install forward deployed tactical
nuclear weapons in 1954, followed by South Korea in 1958.
Massive retaliation both reassured and terrified the allied states in the East Asian
region. Reassurance came from the assumption that the U.S. would obliterate any enemy
threatening to attack or preparing to attack an allied state; if China too aggressively
endangered Japan’s safety, the U.S. would be there to make sure it paid the price with
nuclear destruction. At the same time, however, massive retaliation had many potential
problems. A worry for Japan was the potential for humanitarian and environmental
spillover effects if China was hit by several nuclear strikes. There were also concerns
about the accuracy and precision of the still relatively new nuclear technology, though it
could be argued from the U.S. perspective that this sort of uncertainty actually increased
the strength of its nuclear deterrent.32 Finally, there was the extreme nature of nuclear
weapons, which made their use unjustifiable in almost every circumstance. The conflicts
in Korea and Quemoy-Matsu were thus resolved without U.S. nuclear retaliation.
Policymakers and scholars alike argued that there had to be another strategy for
addressing threats to U.S. interests with less extreme means.33
After increasing criticism by both foreign and domestic voices at the end of the
1950s, the Kennedy administration reasoned that rather than concentrate all hopes and
efforts on nuclear retaliation, especially on the tactical nuclear weapons forward deployed
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in Europe, the response to a looming crisis should be more spread out between nuclear
and conventional capabilities; in other words, flexible response. This strategy did not
reject nuclear weapons entirely. If anything, it gave tactical nuclear weapons a priority
boost.34 It merely emphasized the need to build up conventional capacities alongside
nuclear ones to provide a wider range of military options and control the rate of
escalation if a war were to occur. The doctrine of flexible response also reaffirmed the
need for a continued presence of deployed US forces within allied states in Europe and
Asia, illustrating the impact of alliances on the development of U.S. nuclear strategy.
During this transitional period in U.S. strategy, the Cold War was still in full
force. In the five-year period from 1960 to 1965, the U.S. nuclear arsenal was undergoing
significant changes as the number of bombers began dropping dramatically, from 1,735
to 807; but ICBMs were picking up the slack in numbers from 12 to 854; and SLBMs
made an appearance with 2 in 1960 up to 384 in 1965.35 By 1961, the U.S. had officially
established the nuclear triad, and so had the Soviet Union. These increased capacities
brought about the first mentions of the term “mutually assured destruction,” as both
countries realized that as they developed ever more nuclear weapons and delivery
systems, the results of an all-out nuclear war would have growing consequences for them
both as well as the international community as a whole.
The main issue with the flexible response strategy was its lack of practicality.
President Kennedy had two main complaints: 1) that tactical nuclear weapons were just
as “handicapped” as regular strategic nuclear weapons, despite their increased accuracy
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and higher discrimination in terms of targets; and 2) that the probability of the U.S.
having any sort of control over escalation once a nuclear attack commenced was highly
unlikely, adopting the owlish approach to nuclear policy.36 Flexible response folded
nicely into the overarching strategy of limited nuclear war, which assumed that nuclear
war could be controlled, and perhaps even won, based on technological advances
including deployable tactical nuclear weapons and improved command, control,
communication, and intelligence systems.37 However, opponents of the posture argued
that once tactical nuclear weapons were used, no amount of technology would be able to
control the rate of violent escalation, and total nuclear war would be the only foreseeable
conclusion.38 These concerns were just as applicable to allies and extended deterrence,
both in Europe and in Asia. If the U.S. president was worried about the lack of control
and potential escalation effects of its nuclear arsenal, then its credibility as an effective
protection measure could be interpreted as significantly weakened.
As a result, the next U.S. nuclear strategy that evolved through the late 1960s into
the 1970s was that of counterforce. Counterforce was essentially a more detailed version
of flexible response, providing a retaliation mechanism allowing U.S. administrations to
use a fraction of the nuclear force to attack military bases, or “military and control
targets,” in order to disarm an opponent by preemptively destroying its nuclear weapons.
These included nuclear missile silos, command-and-control, stationary and mobile
military forces, and military industrial facilities.39 Counterforce differed from
countervalue, which was first introduced in 1965, because the latter targeted industry,
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civilian infrastructure, and other societally valuable assets.40 As the Soviet nuclear
arsenal rapidly expanded, counterforce was the U.S. symbolic response to neutralize its
threat capability, while also creating “crisis stability,” or a situation in which “neither
side has an immediate incentive or need to escalate to a nuclear strike.”41 The strategy
hearkens back to the hawkish attitude proposed by Allison, claiming peace through
shows of force. Flexible response and counterforce were both strategies that were
contingent on the idea of preemptive nuclear war fighting, as opposed to restraint and
deterrence. Rather than trying to prevent war from happening in the first place, officials
on both sides of the Cold War were convinced the other side was developing first-strike
capabilities for initiating nuclear war, and thus came up with strategies to eliminate the
other’s nuclear forces before they could retaliate.42 This seemed like a bonus for U.S.
allies seeking protection, except that in the early 1970s the U.S. was also attempting to
implement the Nixon Doctrine, which told allies to take care of their own security unless
the U.S. nuclear umbrella was absolutely needed. The full effects of this paradox will be
discussed in a later chapter through the case of Japan.
Interestingly enough, though Soviet totals of nuclear warheads and delivery
systems continued to rise through this period, the totals of U.S. nuclear warheads and
delivery systems stagnated and in some cases even decreased. Soviet warheads increased
by over 10,000 from 1966 to 19,055 in 1975, while the U.S. decreased its stockpile from
31,700 to 27,052 in that same time duration.43 This was due to a number of contextual
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factors, one being the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970
and promoted three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, a treaty to which the U.S. was a member. During a period of tense
relations with the Soviets, U.S. military planners were also transitioning their strategy
from increasing the nuclear stockpile to finding new and more efficient ways of
delivering the existing warheads.44 On the other hand, as the U.S. streamlined its forces,
the USSR stubbornly maintained its original path by further expanding its arsenal.
These trends were sustained in the 1980s under the Reagan Administration, which
marked some of the most drastic innovations in nuclear weapons technology, even as the
U.S. pared down its total numbers of warheads and delivery systems. Multiple
independently targeted reentry vehicles, or MIRV, put multiple nuclear weapons onto
each missile, allowing a single delivery system to hit several targets at once, thus
increasing efficiency. Stealth aircraft and durable submarines were also developed during
this time. The Trident II SLBMs carried the most advanced warhead in the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, the W-88, while the Peacekeeper ICBM was given the W-87 in 1988.45 These
changes were made in conjunction with steady Soviet warhead increases, hitting a peak in
1986, when the Soviet Union possessed 40,723 over the U.S. arsenal of 23,254.46 The
1980s highlighted U.S. transition from predominantly preemptive nuclear strategies to
deterrent strategies, as it shifted its efforts to focus on advanced second-strike capabilities
rather than all-out massive retaliation in a continuation of its policies from the 1970s.

44

Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey, and Steve Thompson, “Nuclear weapons,” Alpha History,
http://alphahistory.com/coldwar/nuclear-weapons/.
45
“U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs,” Arms Control Association, January 2014,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization.
46
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp.

21
Deterrence efforts continued with negotiations toward a mutual drawdown of
nuclear weapons between the U.S. and the Soviet Union beginning in May 1982, though
the official treaty, known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), was not
signed until July 31, 1991. President Mikhail Gorbachev, struggling to maintain what was
left of the Soviet Union, made an agreement with U.S. President George H.W. Bush to
implement deep reductions of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides, effectively ending
the Cold War.47 START I, which entered into force on December 5, 1994, provided a 15year window for the U.S. and the Soviet Union (the Russian Federation after the Soviet
Union’s December 1991 collapse) to reach a limit of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000
warheads for each side.48 The treaty also banned the construction of new ICBMs and
SLBMs, with the exception of modernization programs, and had an extensive verification
system. Arsenal drawdowns aside, in the 1990s the U.S. also withdrew its forward
deployed nuclear weapons from South Korea, and as of 2014 has withdrawn about 90
percent of its forward deployed nuclear weapons from Europe.49 All U.S. nuclear
strategies prior to this point had been predominantly tailored toward a war with the Soviet
Union; massive retaliation, flexible response, and counterforce were reactions not only to
the capacities and efficiencies of the U.S. nuclear arsenal but also to that of its main rival.
However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. no longer had an
enemy threatening enough to surround with nuclear weapons at the same level. Thus
began a new era in which the U.S. reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile, and its allies
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wondered how credible their extended deterrence commitments still were. This will also
be addressed from the perspective of Japan later on in the paper.
The Post-Cold War State of Nuclear Affairs
The most important developments in U.S. strategy since the START I Treaty have
been the lead but hedge concept, established under the Clinton Administration, and the
“new triad” strategy under the George W. Bush Administration. The former was
introduced in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, and recognized the threat of rising
nuclear proliferation in other states as higher in priority than simply balancing Russia.
This was shown in the increasing concerns from the U.S. and its allies over deterring the
belligerent North Korean nuclear regime. Hence, the U.S. would “lead” in disarming its
nuclear stockpiles, but would “hedge” an affordable arsenal in the case of possible
tensions or disruptions in the international community.50 The latter strategy, proposed by
George W. Bush, was included in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and sought to revive
a form of Kennedy’s flexible response with the “new triad.”51 This triad consisted of
offensive strike systems, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense
infrastructure, tinted with hawkish intentions in the aftermath of the events on September
11, 2001.52
Since President Obama came into office on January 20, 2009, his Prague speech
advocating nuclear zero, the 2010 New START Treaty53 that rejuvenated the arms
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reduction process between the U.S. and Russia, and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
have all contributed to shape the current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. While the Prague
speech gave rhetorical hope to the nonproliferation movement, the New START Treaty
was a practical application of the dovish attitude, setting fresh limits on the bilateral
disarmament process by restricting the parties to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear
warheads and 800 delivery vehicles each by 2020.54 Meanwhile, despite the ongoing
nuclear arms dismantlement, the U.S. is also sticking to its nuclear triad. The 2010
Nuclear Posture Review stresses the need for all three legs of the triad, while also
maintaining the current U.S. posture of nuclear-capable bombers off full-time alert, the
majority of ICBMs on alert, and a significant patrol of nuclear ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) at sea at all times.55 The NPR also indicates the U.S. need for
control in order to avert crises for as long as possible. For instance, “the United States
would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the
vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”56 This reflects the
administration’s recognition of the stigma that using nuclear weapons carries in the
international community, and the need to make nuclear weapons the absolute last resort
in order to avoid a nuclear strike from occurring, either accidentally or purposefully.
As of April 2015, the U.S. is estimated to possess 7,100 nuclear weapons out of a
global total of 15,650.57 Only 1,900 of these, however, are deployed (or operational)
strategic forces, meaning that the majority of the weapons are in reserve or are awaiting
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dismantlement.58 Out of the 1,920 operational strategic warheads, the U.S. has 1,150
deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 470 on intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 300 stored at bomber bases.59 Russia is the only state
remotely close to the U.S. in terms of numbers; it actually has a higher total of nuclear
weapons, capping at 7,500, but only has 1,780 deployed strategic forces, fewer than the
U.S., though not by much.60 The Obama Administration has continued to stress the
importance of further nuclear reductions in conjunction with those of Russia. There is
still a considerable amount of warheads that needs to be maintained and managed, which
will impact both domestic and foreign policies.
The modern nuclear strategy must take into account a few crucial factors. While
non-nuclear weapons states grow increasingly impatient over the lack of faster progress
toward nuclear disarmament, all of the nuclear weapons states are looking to modernize
their arsenals, and none have expressed serious expectations about reaching an eventual
ban on nuclear weapons, despite President Obama’s optimistic statements. As such, the
U.S. must confront its own aging arsenal, a problem which has been put off by several
presidential administrations. Its network of partner countries expects extended nuclear
deterrence; it has a domestic sequestration budget that, if followed, would reduce the
nuclear arsenal rather than maintaining it; and its military forces seem to have lost sight
of the nuclear mission. The U.S. will have to craft a strategy for the future that will
sufficiently protect the nation, satisfy its concerned allies, and maintain realistic levels of
cost and inventory, a daunting task indeed.
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III. ORIGINS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
While the U.S. was making adjustments to its nuclear strategy throughout the
twentieth century, its efforts were complicated by the bilateral security alliance with
Japan. Japan has had diplomatic relations with the U.S. since 1860, but it did not
establish a security-based connection with the larger superpower until after its defeat in
World War II. This chapter will briefly explore the early stage of this security
relationship, particularly focusing on a few main symbolic policies, in order to
understand how two states that were mortal enemies in combat managed to create an
arrangement that remains one of the strongest bilateral alliances today. It should be noted
that there have never been binding public commitments between the U.S. and Japan
detailing exact circumstances for the use of nuclear weapons.61 There are generalized
references to the “U.S. nuclear deterrent” in certain documents, and the term “nuclear
umbrella” is frequently used in academia, but there are no concrete guarantees that U.S.
nuclear weapons will be used in defense of Japan. Instead, a series of historical
agreements has shaped the nature of U.S. extended deterrence over Japan and provided a
foundation for the shifts and periods of tension in the alliance over the following decades.
In the aftermath of the two U.S.-deployed atomic bombs devastating the cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Japan surrendered and admitted defeat to the
Allies on September 2, agreeing to meet the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which
included the dismantlement of the Japanese leadership, Allied occupation of Japanese
territory, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and the unconditional surrender
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of all Japanese armed forces, upon pain of “prompt and utter destruction.”62 The U.S.-led
Government Section of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) took the
responsibility of creating a new Constitution in 1946. Fearing that drafts supported by
Japanese staff would be too lenient on nationalist forces, the SCAP wrote two articles to
restructure Japanese leadership into the new constitution, which went into effect in May
1947: Article I retained the emperor system but reduced his status to that of a symbolic
figure, and the more dramatic Article IX demolished Japan’s previous security policy, as
it reads:
“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.”63

The world was still recovering from the imperial exploits of Japan on both sides of the
Pacific, and Article IX fulfilled the need for a formal legal measure to prevent this from
happening ever again. At the same time, by occupying Japanese territory the U.S. had for
the first time become responsible for keeping Japan away from any international troubles
that might need military recourse. This quickly became relevant at the end of the decade,
when the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950 events solidified U.S. perceptions that Japan was an ally worth keeping. Article IX
has been heavily debated in both domestic and international contexts, with some
complaints that Article IX is too restrictive on what Japan can accomplish, and others that
it is not restrictive enough. For nuclear policy, the problem is that Article IX has been
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largely interpreted as prohibiting Japan from holding offensive military weapons,
meaning it cannot have ICBMs, nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, or bomber fleets on its
territory. This means that U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities that provide Japanese
protection, such as submarines and bombers, cannot technically patrol Japanese waters or
refuel on Japanese bases, a logistical and political issue that in times of crisis could have
significant repercussions for the bilateral relationship.
In 1952, the U.S. ended its military occupation of Japan and signed the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, later
amending it in 1960. Interestingly, while the first article of this document is similar to
Article IX in its ideals of peace, it requires both Japan and the U.S. to “settle any
international disputes in which they may be involved in peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.”64 This front-running
liberal ideology is quickly backed by realist Articles III and V, which commit the two
parties to develop their own separate capacities to resist armed attack and, in the case of
an attack against either Party in territories owned by Japan, “act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”65 The dilemma
when it comes to an attack from nuclear weapons on Japan is that while Japan is
constitutionally prohibited from launching an offensive, the U.S. is not. This is confusing
when determining the exact response the U.S. should take in a hypothetical attack on
Japanese territory. If Japan assists the U.S. with logistical or strategic support in a nuclear
counterattack, it could be considered as a violation to both the bilateral security treaties
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and Japan’s constitution. How far can Article IX be stretched to fit the cause of selfdefense? Different constitutional conditions are extremely damaging for the effectiveness
of extended nuclear deterrence, because if potential foes perceive discrepancies and
uncertainty between the allies, they might be more emboldened to test the allies in a game
of chicken, which could lead to unnecessary violent escalation.
The 1946 constitution and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty go hand in hand
with the Yoshida Doctrine, developed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who served
from 1946-1947 and 1948-1954. This doctrine remained a lasting foundation for policy
through the Cold War and even lingers, some argue, in the decisions of the Abe
administration.66 Its three main tenets reinforced the U.S. as the main guarantor of
Japanese security, directed focus toward reconstructing the domestic economy through
international economic ties, and emphasized the need to maintain a low profile in
international affairs.67 In the context of complete military reliance, a crushed economy,
and international status as an “enemy state”, this was a way for Japan to quietly rebuild
and find its place in the world once more. Yoshida himself had a strong personal
commitment toward minimizing Japanese rearmament and entrenching the norm of
Article IX, since he disliked the Imperial military system, worried about the stability of
Japanese economic recovery, and wanted to smooth over tensions in the international
system.68 It was only under intense U.S. pressure that Yoshida reluctantly set up the
“police reserve force” in 1950, responding to U.S. concerns over the Cold War and
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Korean War. This eventually evolved into the Japan Self-Defense Forces by 1954, which
has branches for land, sea, and air forces, and has evolved into a formidable force of
troops, missile destroyers, tanks, and aircraft. However, these forces have no offensive
agenda besides deployment in international peacekeeping missions under the United
Nations, and even this has been severely limited. 69 They also do not have a nuclear
arsenal with which to retaliate in the case of nuclear war on the Japanese homeland. This
balance has shaped the way in which Japan approaches its own self-defense, the defense
provided by the U.S., and also deterrence provided by the U.S. Though the Yoshida
Doctrine is not as strongly emphasized today as it was during the Cold War, the principle
of military reliance on the U.S. remains entrenched in Japanese foreign policy, despite
attempts by Japanese nationalists to reverse the trend.
The final pillar of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in regard to nuclear weapons is
not actually a concrete piece of legislation but rather an informal principle. On December
11, 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made a statement to the Budget Committee
outlining the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” of not possessing, not producing, and not
permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan.70 Sato, a follower of the
Yoshida Doctrine, understood that proposing these principles as actual legislation would
have caused heavy disputes not only between but also within the political parties due to
contentious opinions on defense. This could jeopardize the stability of the Japanese
political system and possibly the power of individual officials, including Sato himself.71
Nonetheless, the prime minister’s iconic statement remained in the hearts and minds of
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Japanese lawmakers such that any attempt to breach the equilibrium of the Three NonNuclear Principles has been met with earnest opposition. This consensus has a strong
impact in discouraging any change in Japan’s non-nuclear stance, while simultaneously
putting all of the pressure on the U.S. to maintain its security commitments.
Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, the 1952 and 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, the Yoshida
Doctrine, and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles formed the groundwork on which the
U.S. and Japan developed a security alliance incorporating nuclear weapons and
deterrence. Japan viewed the bilateral relationship from a largely pacifist lens, reluctant
to pursue any sort of rearmament, particularly nuclear, and favoring a low international
profile in the interest of rebuilding the domestic sphere. The U.S., continuing its crusade
against communism, was more than willing to keep Japan non-nuclear, but also saw the
island state as a key geopolitical tool in containing the potential threats of China and the
Koreas, thus pushing Japan toward the development of the Self-Defense Forces. The
following chapter will illustrate some key events in which the strength of this alliance is
tested, affecting national attitudes toward nuclear weapons and allied interests, which
have an important impact on diplomatic bilateral relations and provide insight into how
Japan will react given future changes to U.S. nuclear strategy.
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IV. SHIFTS IN THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
Bilateral security ties, like any other relationship, require hard work on the part of
both sides, particularly in times of crisis. The strongest ties are those that persevere and
even grow stronger in the face of unanticipated obstacles. The U.S. and Japan
encountered three such periods after the foundations of the alliance had been laid out in
the 1940s and 1950s. The 1964 Chinese nuclear tests, the Nixon nuclear détente and
nuclear shock of the early 1970s, and the North Korean and Chinese nuclear threats of the
1990s all tested the U.S.-Japan alliance. Each time, the two countries reached an eventual
compromise and maintained stable relations. This chapter will explore these three
situations in order to understand the Japanese perception of the importance of nuclear
deterrence. It will also evaluate the main factors that triggered Japanese concern in each
situation, how Japan responded to these concerns, and subsequently how the U.S.
responded with bilateral or unilateral changes in policy.
A Response to Chinese Belligerence: The U.S. and Japan in the 1960s
From 1964 to 1967, China conducted six nuclear tests, each escalating in yield
and publicity. The first, on October 16, 1964, was accompanied by an official statement
of China’s no-first-use policy and dedication to nuclear disarmament. It was followed by
Chinese Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai urging the leaders of the world to “reach
agreement… that the nuclear Powers and those countries which may soon become
nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other.”72 Needless to say, the
rest of the world was not as pleased about this proposition. Japan’s Foreign Minister
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Etsusaburo Shiina complained to the General Assembly that the test was “open betrayal”
of the world’s “millions upon millions of people,” and emphasized the hypocrisy of
developing nuclear weapons while claiming the goal of abolishing them.73 Japan, among
other countries, openly condemned both the test and the summit proposal, while other
countries like the U.S. and West Germany condemned only the test. The lack of any
serious diplomatic action, even by the superpowers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
allowed the Chinese to escalate their nuclear development plans, putting increasing stress
on both Japan and its security ally. The world watched and waited as China continued to
build its nuclear arsenal, eventually gaining thermonuclear capabilities and, by the sixth
test in June 1967, reaching the capacity to detonate a bomb yielding between 3 and 7
megatons of explosive power, larger than both the U.S. Minuteman and Polaris
missiles.74
Interestingly, Japan was much less prepared for these nuclear tests than the U.S.
In a publicly released conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, nine months before the first Chinese explosion in
1964, Ikeda was recorded as claiming that China has “a long way [to go]” before they
developed an actual weapon.75 Rusk, on the other hand, responded that the U.S. was
expecting China to detonate a nuclear device in one or two years. Ikeda was more
concerned with the threat of the USSR, amid rumors that the Communist superpower had
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moved nuclear weapons to nearby Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.76 This aligned with the
majority opinion in Japan, which at the time placed the Soviet Union as the “highest
critical reaction as a disliked nation,” and put less emphasis on China.77 It also
highlighted the misguided intelligence collected at the time by a country without a
functioning military and severely restricted security budget.
During this period, the U.S. was extending its nuclear deterrence to Japan and the
Asian region as a whole through forward deployed nuclear weapons. The bulk of them
were placed in South Korea beginning in 1958, a collection of surface-to-surface missiles,
cruise missiles, and nuclear bombs for fighter-bombers that totaled 950 at the peak of the
build-up in the mid-1960s.78 In the meantime, the U.S. was stocking up Kadena Air Base
in Okinawa with hydrogen bomb-armed F-100 fighter-bombers, as well as the TM-76
Mace missiles, from 1954 until 1972.79 Okinawa’s geographic location made it a prime
position for strategic deterrence efforts against China and the Soviet Union. The U.S. had
skillfully navigated the complications of Article IX, and later the Non-Nuclear Principles,
by not handing Okinawa’s administrative rights back to Japan when the 1960 Mutual
Treaty was established. This allowed Japan to keep its word on forbidding nuclear bases
on its territory, while still receiving U.S. protection.
Japanese opinion against any sort of nuclear influence within its borders was
amplified in November 1964, when the American nuclear-powered submarine Sea
Dragon docked at the Japanese port of Sasebo a month after the first Chinese nuclear test
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was conducted. The Ikeda cabinet only reluctantly approved the decision, and even then
there was considerable pushback from opponents of the 1960 treaty, who contended that
the visit would entangle Japan in American nuclear strategy, even though the submarine
was not actually carrying nuclear weapons.80 Despite holding the U.S. in the highest
regard in terms of foreign countries, the Japanese were overall skeptical of the U.S.-Japan
security alliance, one of their complaints being that the U.S. ignored Japanese input
toward maintaining the relationship. This skepticism was combined with the opposing
trade and strategic policies each country developed toward China; the U.S. pursued a
policy of total embargo on trade with Communist China, while Japan even with its
nuclear fears did not want to miss the opportunity to expand relations with its neighbor.81
As for the nuclear weapons themselves, the Japanese were still reeling from the
humanitarian effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, making any effort to support nuclear
weapons in the country unacceptable, if not dangerous. So even though there was a very
secure bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Japan on paper, there were also some
glaring differences in opinion and policy that prevented a unified reaction to the Chinese
nuclear tests.
By the sixth test in 1967, then, both countries were fostering concerns about their
own safety against nuclear weapons. The U.S. Defense Department did not think China’s
nuclear arsenal would be developed quickly enough for panicked decisions, but many
Congressmen disagreed, calling for an initial deployment of anti-ballistic missile
defenses for the protection of U.S. territory.82 This only reaffirmed Japanese strategic
concerns; increasing Chinese belligerence was right at their door, unchecked by
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international measures, while their main bilateral ally seemed to be looking more inward
than outward, leaving them in a vulnerable position. Additionally, due to Japan’s
previous focus on the Soviet Union as the main threat to nuclear security, Chinese
nuclear tests came as somewhat of a shock.83 Suddenly, the danger of nuclear
proliferation became more real to Japanese policymakers and scholars than ever before,
the thought being that if China could build the bomb, other developing countries in the
area could too. There were also no concrete diplomatic ties between China and Japan or
China and the U.S. in this period, meaning that in the case of nuclear emergency, few
preventative measures were in place for correcting miscommunications regarding
intentions, and accidental or reactionary nuclear war became an unpleasantly viable
option.
Japanese academics had three other concerns as a result of the Chinese nuclear
tests of the 1960s. The first questioned the Chinese “paper tiger” attitude, first declared
by Chairman Mao Zedong back in 1946.84 In the days before anyone besides the U.S. had
even tested a nuclear weapon, Mao made a famous statement in August 1946 saying that
threatening the use of atomic bombs “is a paper tiger used by the U.S. reactionaries to
scare people.”85 His condescension toward nuclear weapons, as well as his early
teachings that physical manpower is more crucial than weapons in deciding the outcome
of war, led most leaders and scholars to believe that China was not serious about pursuing
a threatening nuclear arsenal. After the tests of the 1960s, however, that paper tiger was
looking more and more lifelike, such that some Japanese worried about the policy being
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only a small part of a larger Chinese conspiratorial strategy, designed to undermine the
credibility of nuclear blackmail by either the U.S. or the Soviet Union.86 Since China did
not share the same logical reasoning as other states, they cautioned, it could be dangerous
for Japan or the U.S. to engage in any sort of conventional deterrence, because the risk of
miscommunication and unintended violence would be too high.
The second concern, addressed both in academia and policy, was the possibility of
China using nuclear blackmail toward Japan. This is not to say that people expected a
direct nuclear attack on Japan; the blowback costs on China, including a perfect excuse
for U.S. retaliation and perhaps even Soviet aggression, would be much too severe for
that to be a feasible option.87 Nevertheless, a “nuclear hostage” situation, with Japan as
the unfortunate victim, could have shaped the U.S.-China relationship in the event of
crises on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, or perhaps unexpected escalation of
the Vietnam War.88 If China did decide to take the risk of sparking cross-Pacific enmity
and taking Japan “hostage,” the strategy became entirely dependent on whether the U.S.
had a credible enough extended deterrent to negotiate a salient solution. Both Japanese
scholars and policymakers admitted that the nuclear blackmail potential only faded in
priority if the bilateral nuclear alliance with the U.S. was strong.89
Then there were some who questioned the strength of this alliance in regard to the
third concern, the U.S. capability to deter attacks against assumed future Chinese
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), not only targeted at the home turf but also at
the territories of extended allies. Though Chinese ICBMs would not be formally
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introduced into the arsenal until the 1970s, China’s six nuclear tests quickly galvanized
fearful thoughts toward the future of missile capabilities. As Congress debated the
finalities of providing new and more technologies toward nuclear weapons defense and
deterrent systems, Japan was coming up with its own alternatives. These included the
development of Japan’s own multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)
nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable submarines; the abandonment of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, in fear of entrapment in international incidents such as the Vietnam War and
other regional tiffs; and the abandonment of the entire bilateral security mechanism
between Japan and the U.S., in order to gain ground as a completely neutral state.90 All of
these concerns affected Japanese and U.S. apprehension toward the 1960s Chinese
nuclear tests.
In response to the perceived Chinese nuclear threat, Japan, despite the
pervasiveness of pacifist Article IX, conducted what would be its earliest and only
nuclearization investigation for the 1968/70 Internal Report.91 This report, written by four
Japanese university academics and commissioned by the advisory research board to
Prime Minister Sato, is the most frequently cited document on the topic both domestically
and internationally, despite its secret status within the Japanese government. It outlines
the obstacles that make a Japanese nuclear weapons program counterproductive to
national interests, addressing the three concerns discussed above. The most vital
conclusion for the purpose of this paper is that it was not worth Japan’s effort to adopt a
nuclear weapons regime, given the financial, technological, and political costs. The
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benefits were reduced dependence on the U.S. and membership in the “nuclear club”, but
given the interdependence and strong relationship between the two countries, it would
have been a small reward for the larger price. The 1968/70 Internal Report looked at both
the Chinese nuclear blackmail case and the U.S. credibility case, and determined the
following logic:
1. China will not attack Japan unless it believes the U.S. will never retaliate on
Japan’s behalf, in other words, unless it does not believe the credibility of the U.S.
extended deterrence.
2. Whether or not Japan believes the U.S. extended deterrence is credible, as
discussed in the third concern, will not affect the way China calculates U.S.
credibility.
3. Therefore, it is in Japan’s best interest to stick with the U.S. extended deterrence,
and not pursue nuclear weapons of its own.92
While the exact impact of the 1968/70 Internal Report will likely remain unknown, its
conclusions, presented by outside Japanese academics with less incentive to skew
numbers and opinions, could have had a major influence on the way in which Japan
conducted diplomatic affairs with the U.S. following the Chinese nuclear tests of the
1960s.
How did all of this affect the alliance, and how did both parties work together to
relieve tensions? For the most part, public verbal assurances were the most effective
method. In January 1965, U.S. President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato assembled in
Washington to reiterate, among other commitments, the stability of the security policy:
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“The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that it is essential for the
stability and peace of Asia that there be no uncertainty about Japan's security. From this
viewpoint, the Prime Minister stated that Japan's basic policy is to maintain firmly the
United States-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty arrangements, and the
President reaffirmed the United States determination to abide by its commitment under
the Treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside.”93

Analysts note the importance of the phrase “any armed attack,” as it was considered by
the Japanese to be the first time in which the U.S. explicitly promised to defend Japan
with both conventional and nuclear forces.94 The other key factor was the enthusiasm of
Prime Minister Sato, who confirmed after the 1965 Joint Communique that no country
would dare to attack Japan under the cover of U.S. protection. Reassurance by the U.S.
president was essential, but domestic concerns within Japan were much more easily
allayed with encouragement from the Japanese leader himself. The impact of these verbal
assurances on Japan is apparent even today, as “even the slightest change of this
government line has caused political chaos in Japan.”95
The Chinese nuclear tests of the 1960s were essential in the way they pushed the
security relationship between Japan and the U.S. toward a more comprehensive nuclear
plan. The U.S. saw that a simple bilateral mutual security treaty would not be enough to
address the complications of external threats, as the sudden aggression from China
caused reactionary opinions among scholars and public opinion, and even led Japan to
consider the pros and cons of nuclearizing. Because of this, the U.S. adjusted their
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diplomatic efforts with strong diplomatic statements and assurances for the Japanese
leadership in order to manage the situation, and eventually reached stability once more.
Nixon and Kissinger Shake Things Up
In the 1970s, Japan faced an entirely different challenge from that of the 1960s:
dealing with sudden changes in U.S. policy.
President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had a distinct view for the U.S. role
in the world. They wanted the U.S. to remain in states where it could make a difference
and protect essential allies, specifically in the context of the Vietnam War, but they also
wanted to give states the “freedom” to defend themselves in order to relieve some of the
burden on U.S. economic resources. Nixon in particular had long been a proponent of
Japanese rearmament, including the removal of pacifist Article IX. In May 1969, Nixon
approved the National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13, which suggested
“moderate increases and qualitative improvements” for Japan’s defense capabilities, so
long as there was no significant military buildup, especially in regard to armed forces.96
Then, two months later in July, Nixon announced the more prominent Nixon Doctrine,
which called for a decrease in U.S. direct involvement abroad, combined with a steady
maintenance of existing treaty commitments and the nuclear umbrella for U.S. allies.97
To close out the year, Nixon urged Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to “develop a significant
military capability” and “assume a greater responsibility” for East Asian regional security
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at a November 1969 summit.98 This summit focused on the reversion of Okinawa and its
bases from the U.S. to Japan.
In the midst of all these policy advancements, some U.S. officials were harboring
concerns about Japan’s potential to return to the world stage as a nuclear power. The
1960s were a relatively peaceful time for Japan, even in nuclear activism, and one could
say the period was one of “nuclear soul-searching,” to test whether Japan had the
capability and interest for handling its own nuclear weapons arsenal. In spite of
documents like the 1968/70 Report, analysts like Herman Kahn were convinced that
“Japan, with its economic and technological potential, would become a nuclear-armed
superpower by the late 1980s.”99 U.S. officials were also aware of the enormous fear
from China and both Koreas over the possibility of Japanese remilitarization. The scars of
the war in East Asia had far from fully healed. Meanwhile, Japan had been revitalizing its
economy over the decades since its original military occupation by the U.S., catapulting it
to great power status in the international economy. At the same time, economic growth
encouraged the beginnings of a more independent, nationalistic public opinion, one that
would rely increasingly on prestige and autonomy rather than survival and dependence,
and one that would cause heightened concerns among U.S. officials.
Yet the Japanese also had reason to worry about U.S. policy, specifically the
Nixon Doctrine. They viewed it as a preview for a later U.S. withdrawal from the East
Asian region, calling into question once again the issue of the credibility of U.S. extended
deterrence in that area of the world. From the Japanese perspective, the U.S. was not only
slowly abandoning it as an ally but was also reaching out to its political enemies, namely

98
99

Ibid.
Ibid.

42
through détente with the Soviet Union over nuclear arsenals and rapprochement with
China.100 This was not the intent of the U.S.; if anything, the U.S. was trying to unite
China and Japan into a trilateral strategic alliance in order to band against the Soviet
Union, and ensuring sufficient deterrent capabilities in the region was an absolute priority
in order to make the grand strategy happen. However, the Japanese fear of entrapment in
other international crises, combined with the questions of U.S. credibility and Chinese
nuclear blackmail that had been lingering since the 1960s, made a reactionary response to
Nixon policies more and more likely.
Yasuhiro Nakasone was one of the first Japanese officials to actively respond to
the Nixon Doctrine and subsequent statements. The nationalistic leader of the Liberal
Democratic Party and the director general of the Japan Defense Agency, Nakasone
determined that while Japan would not directly benefit from developing its own nuclear
weapons, it needed a more secure guarantee from the U.S. in terms of maintaining proper
defensive forces. Nakasone ruffled feathers in the diplomatic communities of both parties,
as he “sought to obtain explicit reassurance from U.S. military officials of nuclear
protection and even suggested that Japan should allow the United States to bring nuclear
weapons into Japan in emergencies.”101 Nothing too productive came from the Nakasone
initiative, namely because of the difficulties of getting such extreme measures through
the U.S. and Japanese legislatures and the contradictory diplomacy of the Foreign
Minister Kiichi Aichi, who took a more moderate stance. In spite of this, Nakasone laid
the groundwork for a few more Japanese nationalistic reactions to Nixon policies to
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reignite a serious debate on nuclear weapons and how they should best protect Japan in
light of external threats.
Just as the responses to the Nixon Doctrine were dying down, Nixon added fuel to
the fire of tensions in the U.S.-Japan security relationship in July 1971, when he made an
official visit to China without informing Japanese Prime Minister Sato until three minutes
beforehand.102 This diplomatic disaster, known as the “Nixon Shock,” came especially
hard to the Japanese. The last thing Japan wanted to see was “Japan Passing,” in other
words, the U.S. bypassing it on the list of priorities to visit the Chinese, one of its more
bitter political enemies. Serious damage was done to the trust and confidence between the
two governments, as well as to the domestic and international reputation of Prime
Minister Sato. Anti-U.S. sentiments increased in Japan in response to Japanese officials’
perception of having been deceived by policymakers such as Nixon and Kissinger. This
was not helped by the apparent double standard of Nixon and Kissinger, who wanted at
all costs to prevent Japan-China collusion against the U.S. At the January 1972 summit
with Sato and the February 1972 summit with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Nixon and
Kissinger used tailored diplomatic arguments in an attempt to persuade the leaders of
both countries that staying with the U.S. and not normalizing Japan-China relations was
the optimal path.103
The U.S. was not the only one with tools in its belt, however. While they indeed
felt betrayed by the larger superpower in the aftermath of the Nixon Shock and the
February 1972 China summit, Japanese officials were also aware of their strategic
location for U.S. tactics in the region, and therefore understood that using the threat of
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blocking access to military facilities, specifically Yokota Base in western Tokyo, could
be leverage toward having a voice in deciding nuclear policy.104 Though nuclear weapons
were being removed from Kadena Air Base, Yokota still made up an important part of the
strategic triad with fighter wings in South Korea and the Philippines to deter attacks from
China. It could also be said that Japanese officials were tired of the “China-first attitude,”
which seemed prevalent at the higher levels of U.S. government. With heightened
concerns over the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia, and dwindling domestic
admiration for the U.S., Japan faced a greater nationalistic desire for diplomatic
independence and, as a result of its economic growth, more recognition as a great
power.105 Nixon soon saw the effects of his audacity on Asian regional diplomacy, as
Japan embarked on a policy pattern of “U.S. Passing,” forgoing prioritizing U.S. interests
and openly seeking its own relationships with other states. In September 1972, newly
instated Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing and worked with
Premier Zhou to end the “abnormal state of relations” between Japan and China and
establish diplomatic normalization. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev received Tanaka in
Moscow in October 1973 to discuss further development of diplomatic and trade relations
between the two countries, especially in regard to the Northern Territories and Siberian
natural resources.106 And disregarding Kissinger’s recommendation to not pursue
unilateral diplomacy in the Middle East, Japan supported oil-producing Arab states in the
October 1973 Arab-Israeli War in order to protect its valuable Persian Gulf oil supply,
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contrary to efforts made by the U.S.107 All of these provided irritants in the U.S.-Japan
security relationship that brought up questions on both sides as to the credibility of the
arrangement, particularly on the important and expensive issue of nuclear deterrence.
By 1973, the Nixon administration definitely had concerns about the Japanese
potential to develop its own nuclear deterrent. The U.S. Department of Defense saw the
rise of Japanese nationalism as a key catalyst toward such a goal. However, the NSC staff
had more pragmatic views of the situation, reporting that while the possibility for
Japanese nuclearization did exist, it would take Japan a considerably long period of time
to construct and would be unnecessarily costly, matching the observations of the
Japanese themselves.108 Hence, as the U.S. transitioned into a new presidency with
Nixon’s resignation, a more moderate policy toward Japan began to emerge. The first
positive diplomatic sign came when new President Gerald Ford, in an effort to boost the
bilateral relationship, made an official visit to Japan in November 1974 and became the
first U.S. president to do so.109 1975 marked a revival of goodwill in Asian relations, as
the Vietnam War ended in April, and in December, Ford introduced the New Pacific
Doctrine, which had three main premises relevant to Japan: 1) the U.S. needed to
continue providing physical strength to maintain the balance of power in East Asia; 2) the
bilateral relationship with Japan was a “pillar” of U.S. strategy; and 3) the U.S. would
continue to normalize relations with China.110 Japan responded by drafting its first
National Defense Program Outline in 1976, led by then Prime Minister Takeo Miki,
which provided a comprehensive national defense strategy and strove to limit the quantity
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of peacetime expenditures while improving the quality.111 To round out the period of
positivity, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, the subcommittee for
defense cooperation under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, published the
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation on November 27, 1978. This document,
which focuses on the two countries’ deterrence posture, defense against armed attacks,
and bilateral cooperation in the case of external threats that might influence Japan,112
restated the commitment of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, as well as “the forward
deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them.”113
Thus, the tensions through the Nixon Doctrine, the Nixon Shock, and manipulative
diplomacy of the great powers lessened slightly in light of new, cooperative policies,
though lingering issues of politics and Japanese constitutional restraints continued to
provide new challenges to the bilateral relationship.
Wohlstetter noted on the nature of U.S. nuclear deterrence: “If dangers are small
because they would produce a U.S. response, then if we want to keep them small, we
should do nothing that would greatly diminish the plausibility of U.S. response.”114 The
U.S. and the Nixon administration learned this lesson firsthand in the context of the
alliance with Japan in the 1970s. When the Nixon Doctrine threatened to withdraw some
U.S. forces in the region, Japan saw the move as both abandonment and opportunity.
Together with the Nixon Shock, the Nixon Doctrine produced more chaos and
misunderstanding than any policy since the military occupation in the 1940s, and
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heightened the danger in terms of nuclear deterrence and the possibility of armed conflict.
Yet, as Wohlstetter commented:
“If the failure were only a lapse in understanding at the highest level of the
American government about the importance and the past role of American foreign
policy in Japanese internal politics, the Japanese might still have to wonder why
there was such a lapse; and whether our leaders would have acted any differently
if they had been better informed.”115
For the future of extended nuclear deterrence and the security relationship with Japan, it
will be crucial to keep in mind the historical precedents that made the 1970s one of the
tensest periods between the two countries.
The 1990s: Enter the Koreas
After the Chinese nuclear tests of the 1960s and the uproar of the Nixon
administration policies in the 1970s, there was a relative lull in the Japan-U.S. security
relationship until the end of the Cold War at the turn of the 1990s. At this point two new
actors became prominent in the East Asian security paradigm: North and South Korea.
Japan had not been directly involved with the Koreas since it occupied those territories in
the early 1900s, and at first it was mainly concerned with South Korea and the diplomatic
ties it was establishing with China and the Soviet Union.116 However, when the
development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs resulted in the
nuclear crisis of 1994 and the Taepodong launch of 1998, Japan experienced two major
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peaks of tension with the U.S. that altered the way in which both countries viewed each
other’s security commitments.
From 1990 to 1991, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear strategic warheads dropped from
5,330 to 3,400.117 At the same time, the forward deployed weapons systems in South
Korea were being dismantled and removed, ICBM launchers were almost halved in
quantity, and nuclear submarines, SLBM launchers, and even bombers faced dramatic
decreases.118 Then, after 1991, there were small fluctuations within the numbers of all
these categories but the overall trend pointed toward further reductions. These statistics
reflected the impact of START I (even though it was not officially entered into force until
1994), as well as Clinton’s lead but hedge strategy, to maintain effective deterrent forces
while also providing a strong example for the rest of the world in disarmament.
Japan’s adverse reaction to the 1994 nuclear crisis can be traced back to its
actions in 1989 and 1990. After a comfortable period of growth in the 1980s, Japan
became embroiled in the “Lost Decade,” during which a sharp increase in inter-bank
lending rates in 1989 led to the burst of the Japanese asset price bubble and the crash of
the Japanese stock market, causing severe economic repercussions throughout the 1990s.
These financial struggles, combined with Japan’s desire to develop its own autonomous
foreign policy from the U.S. and South Korea, influenced the Japanese Foreign
Ministry’s decision to issue a statement in January 1989 indicating Japan’s neutral stance
toward North Korea, despite U.S. and South Korean opposition.119 This remark was
followed by a set of negotiations between North Korean representatives and Deputy
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Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru in September 1990, which resulted in a Three-Part
Declaration between Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Socialist Party
and North Korea’s Korean Workers Party.120 Though this declaration never came into
force, its terms, which sought negotiations to establish official diplomatic relations
between North Korea and Japan, and called for Japan to apologize and compensate North
Korea for atrocities from the early 1900s Japanese occupation period, greatly alarmed the
U.S. After all, perhaps with lingering resentment from the Nixon Shock, Japanese
officials had conveniently neglected to consult either the U.S. or South Korea on their
plans.121 Frantic diplomatic scuffles ensued in an attempt to realign Japanese policy, and
U.S. reprimands led Japan to create a new normalization policy more similar to that of its
allies. However, the seeds of tension between Japan and the U.S. had been planted,
contributing to the diplomatic fiasco of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis.
After test launching a long-range missile, the Nodong-1, into the East Sea/Sea of
Japan in May 1993, North Korea caused peak anxiety levels in the U.S. and its allies in
April 1994, when it removed spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon nuclear reactor but
refused to disclose them to international inspection.122 These fuel rods contained valuable
evidence which could point to the development of a nuclear weapons program. Japan had
every reason to fear these advances; not only could North Korea theoretically attack cities
throughout Japan, including southern cities like Osaka, with its long-range missiles, but
also it could be arming them with nuclear warheads. Unfortunately, it was also torn by its
overwhelming worry of entrapment. Hence, when tensions were escalating and the U.S.
called on Japan to support it in preparation for potential hostilities through intelligence
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gathering and other rear-area logistical backing, Japan was caught off guard.123 Having
no specific contingency plan for supporting U.S. forces outside of a direct attack on Japan,
and worrying that such action would violate Japan’s ban on collective defense, Japan
refused to respond to the U.S. request.124 Though former U.S. President Jimmy Carter
was able to defuse the tensions by visiting Pyongyang in June 1994 and setting a path
toward the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in October, it
was clear that more work was needed to solidify a productive U.S.-Japan alliance. As a
result, Japan revised its National Defense Program Outline in 1995, adding that in
security situations involving “areas surrounding Japan,” Japan will more actively support
UN efforts and “the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S.
agreement.”125 The U.S. had to make sure that Japan stayed in line and understood that
there was a limit to the freedom of determining foreign policy under the alliance,
especially when the two countries were so closely engaged in similar regional issues.
Japan and the U.S. also issued a Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, reaffirming
the importance of the Mutual Security Treaty, even after the major threat of the Cold War.
While these agreements gave the impression that they would prevent future
discrepancies in policy, the Taepodong incident in August 1998 made it seem like none
of it had ever happened. Despite U.S. demands for Japan to align with its North Korea
policy, it still neglected to fully integrate Japan into the information-sharing network it
had in place with South Korea since the Korean War in the 1950s.126 This meant that
when the North Korean two-stage long-range missile, Taepodong-1, was fired over Japan
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in late August 1998, Japan responded in its own unique way, without considering the
interests of its allies. Among its many threats, its withdrawal as a key financial sponsor of
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), suspension of
normalization talks with North Korea, and freezing of food and other humanitarian
support to North Korea were most prominent (and distressing).127 The U.S. and South
Korea, who were more interested in getting a positive deal out of North Korea than
provoking it through intimidation, were appalled by Japan’s audacity, and in the end were
more supportive of the North Korean side. The U.S. affirmed North Korea’s claim that
the Taepodong was a satellite launch instead of Japan’s accusation that it was a missile
test, and forced Japan back into its position as a KEDO supporter.128 Japan had no
feasible alternative: it could not feel safe without U.S. protection, and in order to continue
receiving U.S. protection it had to maintain the trilateral alliance with South Korea and
improve information-sharing and military relationships. A diplomatic method called the
Perry process was implemented to narrow the policy gap among the three countries, and
established the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in April 1999.129 The 1998
U.S. Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific focused on the bilateral relationship with
Japan as “the linchpin of U.S. security strategy in Asia,” and the revised Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, approved by the Japanese Diet on May 24, 1999,
provided more specificity on cooperation and planning in response to threats directly and
indirectly related to Japan.130
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In spite of these reinforcements of the alliance, the threat from North Korea and
the pressures from the U.S. to redirect Japanese foreign policy did give incentive to Japan
to consider its own defense capabilities in a way that was not seen during the Cold War.
In November 1998, for example, Japan announced its intentions to develop its own
surveillance satellite system, and in March 1999, JDA Director General Norota Hosei
informed a Diet defense panel that if a missile attack on Japan was “imminent,” Japan
had the right to make preemptive military strikes.131 These proactive moves, in addition
to the decision to obtain mid-air refueling aircraft for the purpose of long-range strike
missions by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, illustrated that while Japan has had a
pervasive culture of pacifism, it is not necessarily one widely shared by all in the
Japanese government, and therefore not necessarily a permanent one.
Conclusion
The Chinese nuclear tests of the 1960s, the Nixon policies of the 1970s, and the
rise of the North Korean nuclear regime in the 1990s provided three main periods of
tension for the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Reacting both to these changes and the trends
in the structure and quantity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Japan often developed
controversial policies that shook the alliance and required a considerable amount of
diplomatic effort to resolve. The U.S. was good at fixing these issues once they had
become large enough to notice, but it also continued to make mistakes by leaving Japan
out of important policy and information-sharing and remaining ambiguous on its security
commitments. Japan’s attraction to the nuclear deterrent was apparent throughout these
periods, despite domestic opposition to having nuclear weapons on physical Japanese
territory. It was simply too cost effective and easy to remain under the U.S. nuclear
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umbrella, and a real conventional or nuclear force would violate the constitutional
restraints placed on Japan since World War II. As the focus of this paper turns to current
challenges and changes in domestic and international policy for both countries, these
historical precedents make useful comparisons when determining the triggers for
Japanese concerns in the alliance and the appropriate U.S. responses to mitigate those
concerns.
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V.

THE ALLIANCE TODAY

Having examined the three main periods of tension related to nuclear weapons
that tested, but did not break, the security relationship between Japan and the U.S., this
paper now turns to the present. The past few years have brought several important
changes to the way both sides view the bilateral alliance, giving it unique context today
that did not exist in the 1960s, 1970s, or 1990s. This chapter will outline first the main
framework of the U.S.-Japan extended deterrence relationship today, encompassing both
diplomatic and military cooperative efforts. The second part will analyze the concerns
held by both the U.S. and Japan in regard to this alliance as well as to the U.S. nuclear
arsenal. These range from U.S. nuclear modernization plans to Japanese apprehension of
abandonment in the face of regional conflict.
Alliance 101: Modern U.S.-Japan Security Relations
There are currently 50,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan, spread out between 90
different military facilities within the territory.132 In exchange for Japanese hosting of
soldiers, the U.S. provides Japan with extended deterrence, using both conventional and
nuclear arsenals. Most experts assert that the original, asymmetric alliance between the
two countries has evolved into a “more balanced security partnership,” particularly since
the turn of the century.133 Recognizing that information sharing and discussions were
essential to appeasing Japan’s concerns about the alliance throughout history, the U.S.
established two different diplomatic mechanisms. The Cabinet-level Security
Consultative Committee, also known as the “2+2” since they are composed of the U.S.
Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts, meets to present
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alliance concerns at a general level and releases public statements with their goals and
strategies.134 The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, on the other hand, works
specifically for the purpose of U.S. assurance for its ally, and allows for an exchange of
opinions and strategies to influence subsequent nuclear policies. An example of this is the
Japanese policy makers’ impact on the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; according to
reports, the Japanese dissuaded an attempt to determine the “sole purpose” of U.S.
nuclear weapons as deterring nuclear attack.135
As part of the more balanced alliance, Japan has also been working toward
bolstering its own defenses, specifically in the realm of ballistic missile defense (BMD).
After its 2003 purchase of technologies and interceptors developed by the U.S., Japan has
become the second most potent BMD capability in the world, working with the U.S. to
deploy both ground-based BMD units and BMD-capable ships.136 When Prime Minister
entered his second term in office in September 2012, he authorized the first increase in
the Japanese budget in years, a 0.8 percent jump for the fiscal year (FY) of 2013.137 From
that point on, there were three major developments in Japanese defense policy. The first
was the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, which
introduced the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” based on international
cooperation, and stressed the need for new military hardware, as well as “extensive
persistent ISR,” referring to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.138
Concurrently published on December 17, 2013 was Japan’s first ever National Security
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Strategy. This document reinforced the “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and laid out
the country’s three objectives of deterring threats toward Japan, improving the security
environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and improving the global security environment,
keeping in mind the “complex and grave national security challenges.”139 Moreover, on
July 1, 2014, Abe announced in a press conference that according to a Cabinet decision,
Japanese forces would be able to come to the aid of other countries under very specific
circumstances.140 This was a revolutionary reinterpretation of the constitution and the
right of “collective self-defense,” and would permit more flexible Japanese engagement
in activities such as noncombat logistical operations, defense of distant sea lanes, and
U.N. peacekeeping operations.141
To round out the alliance, the U.S. and Japan are currently in the process of
revising the bilateral Mutual Defense Guidelines, which have not been changed since
1997. On his visit to Tokyo in April 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called the
revisions transformative for U.S. military ties with Japan, one main objective being to
establish new guidelines for cooperation in the fields of cyber warfare, military uses of
space, and ballistic missile defense, among others. The other major change, according to
U.S. officials, would “allow Japan to respond to an attack on the U.S. military even if the
American forces are not acting in defense of Japan at the time.”142 It is assumed that the
finalized guidelines will be published in time for Abe’s visit to Washington on April 28.
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U.S. Concerns
The U.S. has two main concerns when it comes to the nuclear weapons posture
and the bilateral relationship with Japan: the direction of nuclear modernization, and the
possibility of reemerging hostile Japanese policies.
Nuclear modernization
As mentioned earlier in this paper, Obama’s 2009 Prague speech and the success
of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between Russia and the U.S. brought a
fresh wave of hope to the nonproliferation regime, particularly in regard to the possibility
of a global nuclear zero. However, recent events have seen a gradual but steady disregard
for these ideals on both the U.S. and Russian sides, leading to more perceptions of
urgency toward nuclear modernization.
At the current moment, the fate of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is more closely tied to
that of the Russian nuclear arsenal than any time since the Cold War. Woolf of the
Congressional Research Service notes that while the Bush Administration denied any
connection between the U.S. arsenal and Russia’s, since “the United States and Russia
were no longer enemies,” the Obama Administration has taken the opposite approach,
arguing that the relationship between the sizes of the two arsenals is still relevant.143 The
Administration has staunchly refused to make unilateral cuts to its arsenal, and will
further reduce the numbers of warheads under New START Treaty limits only if it is
paralleled by Russia.
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According to President Obama, “The New START Treaty responsibly reduces the
number of nuclear weapons and launchers that the United States and Russia deploy, while
fully maintaining America’s nuclear deterrent.”144 The goal of the treaty is to reach a
deployed strategic nuclear arsenal limit of only 1,550 warheads, as well as a cap of 700
total nuclear missiles and heavy bombers, on each side by 2018.145 As of April 1, 2015,
Russia is reported to possess 1,780 deployed strategic warheads, while the U.S. possesses
1,900.146 Each country has increased its number of deployed nuclear warheads over the
most recent six-month period, the U.S. increasing by 57 additional warheads, Russia by
131, an anomaly that prominent Federation of American Scientists researcher Hans
Kristensen believes is nothing to be worried about, but which certainly illustrates the
slow rate of disarmament in recent years.147
Furthermore, after the Russian invasion of Crimea in March 2014, unnamed
Russian officials from the Defense Ministry gave interviews to media outlets expressing
their displeasure of the “groundless threats to Russia from the U.S. and NATO regarding
its Ukrainian policy,” and hinted at the possibility of suspending permission for the U.S.
to carry out New START-mandated inspections in Russia.148 This fortunately never came
about, but the aggressive remarks highlighted the increased activity on the Russian side
related to nuclear forces. Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s
Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, seemed to have a similar attitude
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when he stated in January 2015: “I am not ruling out the possibility that Washington
could force us to… adjust our policy in this area.”149
Supplementing these sorts of declarations is the effort by Russia, and indeed by
all of the other nuclear weapons states, to modernize their nuclear arsenals. While it is
estimated that only 10 percent or $54 billion of Russia’s defense budget will go toward
its aging nuclear forces, the U.S. is also concerned with the recent developments of
Russian medium-range cruise missiles, large ballistic missile submarines known as
“boomers,” and attack submarines.150 France is deploying new missiles and warheads
expected to last until the 2050s; Pakistan is working on new cruise missiles and shortrange rockets; and even NATO forces will be updated with new B61 guided bombs and
nuclear F-35A fighter-bombers to be implemented in the 2020s.151 In this environment,
the U.S. is and plans to continue mirroring the other nuclear weapons states in
modernizing its own nuclear arsenal.
The push for nuclear zero is also stymied by no other than U.S. non-nuclear allies.
Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury
Institute of International Studies at Monterey, stated that in the current environment, “the
primary source of nuclear deterrence for US allies comes from the strategic triad of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and bombers.”152
When the U.S. even remotely considers removing a leg of the triad or implementing
severe drawdowns of the arsenal, it brings the scrutiny of its allies, and in the end it
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comes down to how well the U.S. can convey its intentions. If Tokyo and Seoul are not
convinced that the existing arsenal will protect their cities just as well as Los Angeles and
New York, there will be a serious confidence problem. And since both countries have
considered their own nuclear weapons programs in the past, the more assurances they
have, the safer and more stable the region will be.
External factors aside, Woolf identifies two major internal domestic factors
playing a role in the U.S. nuclear modernization issue: overall cost, and security and
management issues.153 The practical reality is that the U.S. cannot afford an excessive
nuclear arsenal, and the nuclear weapons and delivery systems it has now are “reaching
the end of their service lifetimes.”154 Therefore, as Congress examines the modernization
budget provided by the Obama Administration and the military, determining the optimal
amount and positioning of these weapons will also determine the future nuclear force’s
size and structure. In January 2015, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that over
the 10-year period from 2015 to 2024, the nuclear budget will cost the U.S. $348 billion,
averaging $35 billion a year.155 However, this does not properly show what Defense
Department officials are calling the “modernization mountain” of the late 2020s, when
the U.S., given the current trajectory, will attempt to replace all three legs of the triad and
buy new fighter planes at the same time.156 Over the next thirty years, the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies estimated in 2014 that costs to maintain the current
arsenal, buy replacement systems, and upgrade existing nuclear bombs and warheads will
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reach $1 trillion.157 Though Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has staunchly supported
the full nuclear triad, whether the U.S. will have the financial capability to achieve these
plans among all of its other commitments will certainly be a point of contention over the
next few decades. Following this train of thought, the security and management issues
facing the nuclear enterprise are just as much a result of cost as they are of neglect by
higher-level administration. The incident of a B-52 bomber accidentally carrying live
warheads across the country in 2007; the unintentional shipment of Minuteman III
missile nosecones to Taiwan in 2008; and the widespread cheating scandal among Air
Force ICBM launch crews in 2012 are only a few of the many problems the U.S. has
faced in failing to provide adequate purpose for the various branches of the nuclear
enterprise, hindered further by the lack of sufficient resources to maintain and improve
the system. If the U.S. wants to demonstrate to the world that it has a tight, efficient,
dangerous arsenal, then it has to think long and hard about the cost of its operations, as
well as the effect it has on both the physical and human forces responsible for the
enterprise.
Matthew Kroenig wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that a failure to
modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be “irresponsible,” claiming that: “a crippled
U.S. nuclear force would embolden enemies, frighten allies, generate international
instability, and undermine U.S. national security. In other words, it would risk ruining the
world that currently exists.”158 This ideology is fully embraced by the U.S. military, as
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seen in the ongoing modernization plans for the nuclear arsenal. There are three main
categories: modernized strategic delivery systems, refurbished nuclear warheads, and a
modernized nuclear weapons production complex, the last one referring namely to a
proposed Uranium Processing Facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is scheduled to
cost between $6.5-7.5 billion.159 Strategic delivery systems upgrades include: the
reconstruction of the Minuteman III ICBMs and Trident II SLBMs, extended service
lives for the current ballistic missile submarines as well as the development of new
replacement ones, ongoing B-2 and B-52H bomber technical updates, and plans to
develop a new Long-Range Bomber and Long Range Standoff Missile.160 Moreover, the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has and will continue to implement
Life Extension Programs for the entire U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads and bombs.
Potential for the reemergence of reactionary Japanese policies
Despite the progress of the U.S.-Japan alliance in becoming more equal partners,
the U.S. still retains concerns and frustrations about past and potential reactionary
policies from the Japanese government. Some historical concerns were highlighted in the
last chapter, when Japan reacted to events such as the Chinese nuclear tests in the 1960s,
the Nixon policies of the 1970s, and the North Korean nuclear incidents in the 1990s.
However, there are a few other, more tenacious issues that, should Japan react poorly,
will squander U.S. efforts in the region and lower the effectiveness of the extended
deterrence-based alliance. These issues involve Yasukuni Shrine, the controversy over
wartime comfort women, and the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
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The issue over Yasukuni Shrine remains relevant to the alliance as Japan begins
to loosen some of the stringent restrictions on the use of its Self-Defense Forces.
Yasukuni Shrine houses the spirits of the 2.5 million Japanese citizens who lost their
lives in various conflicts, including World War I and World War II, enshrined in the form
of “written records, which note name, origin and date and place of death.”161 The
controversy arises from the 14 Japanese Class A war criminals who were convicted for
crimes in World War II; these individuals remain enshrined at Yasukuni with the others,
and continue to be visited by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members. Abe himself
caused a controversy in December 2013 when he visited the site, sparking criticism from
China and South Korea as well as the U.S. While Abe seems to have tempered his views
on the issue (in 2014 he visited an alternative site called Chidorigafuchi National
Cemetery to honor the war dead, instead of Yasukuni), the issue could easily become a
point of argument strong enough to divide the region, which is hardly in U.S. interests. It
also means that China and South Korea have stronger reason to oppose Abe’s
constitutional reinterpretation in July 2014, and will no doubt continue to express
opposition even at the revision of the Mutual Defense Guidelines.
The comfort women policy was instated by the Japanese imperial military during
its expansion in the 1930s and 1940s, authorizing the practice of forced prostitution.162 It
has been largely condemned by the international community, even by the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2007. However, the Abe Administration has been reluctant to
acknowledge these atrocities, which affected countries from South Korea to Vietnam to
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Burma and Timor.163 Abe has done seemingly everything possible to undermine progress
on this issue. In 2006, he called into question a 1993 joint statement with South Korea
called the Kono Statement, which apologized to the comfort women victims and
officially acknowledged the responsibility of the Japanese military.164 Though no changes
were made to the statement, Abe proceeded in October 2014 to appoint Hirofumi
Nakasone as the chair of a commission to “consider concrete measures to restore Japan’s
honor with regard to the comfort women issue.”165 Nakasone is the son of Yasuhiro
Nakasone, former prime minister of Japan, reactionary Nixon-era JDA leader, and the
creator of the first “comfort station” back in 1942. These kinds of diplomatic misconduct
harm the reputation of Japan, and by association, the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. continues
to watch Japan closely on the issue and counter when necessary in order to maintain its
strong alliances.
Finally, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is the most illustrative example of a
regional tiff that can easily spill over into unpleasant scenarios for the U.S. This small
group of islands is administered by Japan but claimed by both China and Taiwan, and has
been a contentious location due to its cultural history and nearby energy deposits. The
issue returned to the foreign policy spotlight in August 2012, when the Japanese
government purchased three of the five islands from a private landowner, hoping to gain
more legitimacy over the territory. China responded with anti-Japan protests, a drop in
Sino-Japanese trade, and regular deployments of maritime law enforcement ships near the
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islands.166 As both countries scramble their fighter jets and play a ridiculous game of
brinkmanship, the U.S. has every right to be concerned. Despite it taking no official side
in the territorial dispute, the U.S. has in theory taken the Japanese side due to its
commitments under the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which states the U.S. must
protect “the territories under the Administration of Japan,” the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
being part of those administrated territories.167 As a result, if things get ugly between
China and Japan, and threats of violent conflict grow more realistic, the U.S. would have
to choose between upholding its defense commitments for an ally and starting a war with
China. It is a highly unfavorable position to be in, and thus the U.S. maintains some
concerns about the effects of stubborn Japanese policies.
Japanese Concerns
In relation to the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and its nuclear arsenal, Japan has
two main concerns: the possibility of military entrapment in future conflicts, and
abandonment in the face of regional and international foes. While both concepts are
crucial aspects of Japanese perspective, abandonment has become the more predominant
of the two in recent years.
Entrapment
It is important here to make the distinction between entrapment and entanglement,
though some scholars have used the terms interchangeably. Entanglement is defined as
the process by which a state is compelled by the contents of its alliance to aid an ally in a
“costly or unprofitable enterprise.”168 An example of entanglement is Japan involving the
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U.S. in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute under the parameters of the 1960 Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security, even though the U.S. has no significant interest in the
islands. The U.S. is required to uphold its commitments on an issue that has no direct
pertinence to its interests, specifically due to one of the main pillars of the bilateral
alliance. On the other hand, one of the most convincing definitions of entrapment entails:
“a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky or
offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement.” Japan was deeply concerned
about entrapment in the 1950s, before the signing of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security. A weaker power at the time and with little control over the
actions of the U.S., Japan was worried about the potential for entrapment in America’s
aggressive crusade against Communist countries, especially with American military bases
on its territories and a somewhat ambiguous security alliance.169 Nowhere in the major
alliance documents is there mention of Japanese commitment to prevent the spread of
communism at all costs. Because of this, Japanese officials, supported by the Japanese
public, took proactive diplomatic steps to ensure that by the time the 1960 treaty came
around, entrapment would no longer be as pressing of an issue. On a general scale, Japan
is more focused on the dangers of entrapment with the U.S. than entanglement.
The chances of an entrapment scenario are relatively rare, but nevertheless, there
are two types that Japan is most concerned about: regional entrapment and international
entrapment. Regional entrapment is most apparent with Japan’s neighbor and minor rival,
South Korea. Both countries are closely allied with the U.S., and neither country is
particularly fond of the other, though both rely on each other in the general security
framework. In regard to this strange dynamic, a worry for Japan is that if the U.S. gives
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too much strength, particularly in nuclear backing, to South Korean defenses, North
Korean fears of encirclement will increase, making the region even more volatile.170 It
could embolden South Korea toward its northern neighbor, and it could affect Japan
internally, since it has a pro-DPRK resident population, called Chosen Soren, which has
already been embroiled in several controversies with Japanese nationalists.171 Too much
Southern provocation of the North, if backed by U.S. nuclear power, could eventually
cause a preemptive reaction by North Korea, which would undoubtedly involve Japan
due to its geographic proximity and relationship with the U.S.172 In addition to the Koreas,
Japan also harbors concerns about regional entrapment with Russia. The U.S. is taking a
more aggressive stance toward Russia, especially in light of the Ukraine conflict and the
controversy over Russia’s potential violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty. Given these issues, taking into consideration Japan’s existing territorial disputes
with Russia, Japan could be pulled into a conflict not explicitly listed in its treaty
agreements with the U.S. Japan did not want to fight the Soviet Union back in World War
II; it certainly does not want to face Russia as an adversary now.
International entrapment for the U.S.-Japan alliance is mostly enshrined in
overseas conflicts such as the Iraq War in 2003. When the U.S. took an offensive stance
in the conflict and announced the possibility of weapons of mass destruction, its allies,
most of whom did not have direct interests in the conflict, were faced with a tough choice.
They could refrain from participation and potentially lose support from the dominating
superpower, or support the war and risk the lives of their own citizens. Japan and South
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Korea ended up making the latter decision, sending 1,000 and 3,000 troops respectively
to the war-torn region, and while they had some incentive to direct more U.S. policy
attention to the North Korea issue, it is certain that neither country had a serious desire to
get involved.173 The risk of international entrapment is more salient now than in previous
years, particularly with U.S. troops back in Iraq and ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen,
and Ukraine. Japan does not want to engage in these disputes, and will be wary of how
loosely its collective self-defense measures are interpreted when assessing responsibility
for international peacekeeping.
Abandonment
While Japan may have concerns about entrapment, abandonment is a more
persistent issue when it comes to the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Abandonment is the
fear that “the ally may leave the alliance, may not live up to explicit commitments, or
may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.”174 Also known
as “de-coupling,” abandonment, which could happen if the U.S. deemed it more
worthwhile to protect its own homeland and interests than Japan’s, is a prospect over
which Japan has repeatedly expressed concern.175
There are two countries that Japan fears the most in regard to U.S. abandonment:
China and North Korea. China and Japan have many ongoing historical and modern-day
feuds, on everything from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to revising Japanese textbooks for
historical atrocities to clashing nationalism on both sides. Because China has a slowly but
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steadily growing nuclear arsenal, with long-range capacities and increasingly
sophisticated delivery systems, Japan could be at risk of abandonment if the U.S. decides
that in a confrontational situation with China, it is not worth the effort of threatening
extended nuclear deterrence over Japan.
North Korea is more likely than China to push Japan into a position of
abandonment. North Korean officials stated in 2013 that: “Japan is always in the crosshairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will
touch Japan first.”176 Lingering wartime and xenophobic resentment, combined with
proxy aggression toward the U.S. through Japan, are the most convincing motivations
behind this statement, though the degree to which each plays a role is a topic for another
paper. Three risks for Japan from North Korea include: 1) further North Korean
provocation by non-nuclear means; 2) escalation in tensions and threats in the case of a
miscalculation from North Korean leaders; and 3) blatant aggression from North Korean
nuclear weapons.177 After the attempts of the 1990s, normalization talks have not been
renewed between the two countries, making non-violent solutions to dissolve tensions
more difficult to implement. In spite of all U.S. assurances to the contrary, Japan still sees
North Korea as a significant threat to its security, and thus naturally sees the potential for
U.S. abandonment.
Both entrapment and abandonment are examples of Japan anticipating the failure
of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Interestingly enough, failures of deterrence are not
as uncommon as one might hope, and are dependent on any of the following three
factors: a highly motivated weaker state, a weaker state misperceiving some facet of the
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situation, and a stronger state with detected vulnerability.178 The next chapter will
connect the concerns of the current alliance to the evolving nuclear posture in order to
determine the best path toward a more comprehensive, stable security relationship
between the U.S. and Japan.
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VI. EVALUATION OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FULFILLMENT
Keeping in mind the strategic evolution of U.S. nuclear posture, the original
framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the challenges the alliance has faced over the past
century, and the current circumstances of the bilateral nuclear relationship, this section of
the paper now returns to its main two questions. First, how well has the current nuclear
posture covered the security commitments established in the U.S.-Japan alliance up to
this point? And second, how well will the changing nuclear posture fulfill alliance
requirements in the future?
For a straightforward answer to these questions, this paper asserts that while the
U.S nuclear posture up to this point has been satisfactory enough to prevent panic and
ensure protection of Japan, the evolving nuclear posture from this point onward will
strengthen the credibility of existing security commitments, deter potential attackers, and
give Japan the confidence to become a more coordinated partner in the relationship.
Security attitudes, or a country’s views on the use and placement of military force
and foreign intervention measures, have played and will continue to play a role in these
evaluations of security commitments. In the aftermath of World War II, Japan was forced
to retreat from its foreign exploits, and adopted the 1947 isolationist constitution that
renounced all forms of war. It has always been very concerned about issues within the
Asian region, and only mildly concerned about conflicts in other parts of the world. It has
stuck firmly, with a few minor deviations, to its drive for peace and conflict resolution
over violent encounters. While the pacifist attitude has mostly remained in both the
Japanese public and the administration, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second term has
begun see some historic changes, with the 2014 shift to “Proactive Contribution to Peace”
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and discussions of increased defense budgets. Meanwhile, the U.S. used to be focused on
fighting Communism, not hesitating to antagonize countries from North Korea and
Vietnam to the former Soviet Union, and coming up with aggressive strategies such as
massive retaliation and flexible response in preparation for bombing these places with
nuclear missiles. When the Cold War ended, it reduced its nuclear weapons arsenal,
having lost its major enemy, and began to take a more cautious approach, using threats of
conventional force in addition as a softer alternative to nuclear. Then the Obama
Administration introduced the “Pivot to Asia” concept in 2011, stating that from a
strategic standpoint: “maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is
increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea, countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or
ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.”179 This is
combined with the understanding that the U.S. is in the process of modernizing its
nuclear arsenal, which is designed to more efficiently protect its national and
international interests. The historical alliance was built on a bilateral relationship with
very different perspectives on war and nuclear weapons, which made for a less credible
nuclear deterrent and thus affected the credibility of the two countries’ security
commitments both during and after the Cold War. However, in recent years there seems
to have been an alignment of sorts due to a mutual focus on the Asian region, as well as
increased willingness to engage with each other on nuclear issues. These parallel attitudes
strengthen the security commitments of the bilateral alliance, and will continue to
strengthen them as modernization progresses.
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Additionally, the abrupt policy discrepancies or “surprises” between the two
countries on nuclear weapons issues have also been influential in shaping the current U.S.
nuclear posture for protecting Japan. Japan only considered nuclear weapons
development in the late 1960s because of its concern that the U.S. nuclear arsenal would
not deter a Chinese nuclear attack, especially with U.S. attention fixated on the Soviet
Union. The 1970s Japanese policy of “U.S. Passing,” in response to the Nixon Doctrine,
was made out of fear that the U.S. nuclear posture was too engaged with China, which
could have negated the extended deterrence protection for Japan. And Japan’s hesitation
to give logistical aid to the U.S. against North Korea in the 1990s was not only contingent
on its pacifist constitution but also on its unease at the withdrawal of U.S forward
deployed nuclear forces from South Korea in 1991. All of these examples illustrate that
without aligned security attitudes and a mutual understanding of the priorities and
structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Japan begins to question the credibility of U.S.
security commitments and looks into other avenues for national defense. Fortunately, in
the past few years there have been no major incidents of “surprises” from the Japanese in
terms of nuclear security, signaling a positive trend in the development of the U.S.-Japan
alliance, even with an evolving nuclear posture.
Given these improvements in the alliance up to now, how can the U.S. maintain
its progress and effectively deter attacks on Japan, without making Japan feel that the
security commitments are either too loose or too restrictive? Do we have any reason to be
worried about the alliance as the nuclear posture changes?
To deter attacks specifically on Japan, the U.S. needs to focus on how it portrays
the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance in its security negotiations with other states, especially
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countries like China and Russia. If, in its haste to make friendlier relations with China,
the U.S. gives too much of an impression that the U.S.-Japan alliance is irrelevant, it
automatically detracts from the credibility and security of the relationship itself. On the
physical arsenal side, since deterrence is about threatening second-strike capability, as
opposed to defense, there is no need to surround Japan with nuclear weapons and hope
for the best. However, as the modernization process is slowly implemented throughout
the branches of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, adequate amounts of deployed forces need to be
clearly displayed to any state who might think about sneaking in an attack. The word
“adequate” when referring to the number of U.S. nuclear weapons is one of the most
disputed terms in the business. Proponents of full triad revitalization argue that any other
cuts to the nuclear deterrent is harmful to the U.S. arsenal as a whole; in the words of
Peter Huessy, president of the consulting firm GeoStrategic Analysts, “Cutting the very
backbone of our nuclear security is not the way forward to a safer world or safer
America.”180 Others view the continuation of the triad as a detriment to international
disarmament and the NPT, which will lead to more instability.181 No matter how the
nuclear force ends up, as long as it gives the impression of being comprehensive and
daunting, and the U.S. shows strong diplomatic support of the alliance when dealing with
third parties, attacks toward Japan should be effectively deterred.
The other part of this equation is the objective to keep Japan satisfied and
confident in the bilateral relationship. It is crucial that the U.S. not attempt to shut down
Abe’s efforts to reinterpret the constitution. Despite some alarmist reports, the prospect of
a remilitarized Japan under Abe is far from reality. Brad Glosserman and David Kang
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write in The National Interest that while Abe aims for Japan to have a new regional
security role, there are many factors limiting the speed and scope of military
expansion.182 These include public hostility toward extreme constitutional
reinterpretations, a considerably restrictive defense budget, and high maintenance costs
for existing personnel and equipment.183 Besides, Abe’s attempts to push for “Proactive
Contribution to Peace” are in U.S. interests; after all, the tensions from the Nixon
Doctrine were based on the U.S. assumption that Japan should take up a greater share of
the alliance burden. As the countries work together for the Mutual Defense Guidelines
and other cooperative measures, the U.S. should nurture the more active Japanese
security policy while also being on the alert for moves that could push it too closely
toward a stance resembling remilitarization. The other important point for the U.S. is to
keep Japan informed through diplomatic, intelligence, and military channels, so that if the
U.S. President makes a controversial policy statement about or related to nuclear security
alliances, such as the Nixon Doctrine, it does not cause Japan to have a violent reaction.
Military information-sharing might be the most important out of the three channels; if
Japanese defense officials can visually verify and understand the U.S. nuclear posture and
how it applies to extended deterrence, there might be less concern for the stability of the
alliance. If the U.S. uses its hard and soft power wisely, it can establish an even stronger
alliance with Japan than before.
That being said, there are two major reasons to be concerned about the alliance as
it aligns with the evolving U.S. nuclear posture. The first is if Japan escalates tensions
with its Asian neighbors regarding the historical disputes mentioned in the previous
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chapter. While the issues of the Yasukuni shrine, wartime comfort women, and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are all rooted in deep historical sensitivities, the one of most
concern to the U.S. is the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial dispute. This is because if
China decides to take more aggressive military measures to gain ownership of the islands,
the U.S. will have to step in due to its commitment to protect any and all territories under
the administration of Japan, a category under which the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
currently fall.
The second concern is if the modernization trajectory of the U.S. nuclear arsenal
changes drastically without the U.S. briefing or consulting its allies. While the current
official U.S. nuclear posture relies on a full nuclear triad, others have proposed several
different iterations for the arsenal. Dana Johnson, Christopher Bowie, and Robert Haffa
at the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies suggested in 2009 that the U.S. should shift
to a dyad of SLBMs and ICBMs, phasing out the bomber leg of the triad.184 In the same
year, Jeff Richardson at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory advocated that
ICBMs should be the retiring leg of the triad, citing bombers and SLBMs as the more
practical dyad.185 Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay of the Cato
Institute took an even more extreme approach in 2013, claiming that SLBMs alone would
be more than sufficient to cover the deterrent needs of the U.S. and its allies.186 It is not
within the scope of this paper to discuss which arrangement is the most optimal. However,
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if one of these models ends up convincing enough to sway the next U.S. presidential
administration, there needs to be a very strong marketing campaign to the domestic
sphere, as well as U.S. friends and foes, that the new arrangement will provide just as
much deterrence capability as the original triad. Otherwise, the other nuclear weapons
states see the move as weakness, Japan’s concerns are reignited, and the U.S. will have a
decreased nuclear force with fewer deterrent options, combined with more international
tensions, creating a more chaotic situation than when it started the modernization process.
Maintaining the positive trend of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship with regard
to weapons will not be easy. It will take serious hard work on the part of both parties, and
there are many factors to keep in consideration, both inside and outside of the alliance. In
spite of this, it seems that ongoing developments will push the alliance toward an ever
more trusting and responsible relationship.
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VII. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, pushing the nuclear launch button is one of the least desired
and most controversial policy moves in the world of international relations. It has not
been approved to use against another country since 1945, yet U.S. alliances continue to
promise extended nuclear deterrent capabilities under the assumption that if enemies try
to attack, they will receive nuclear catastrophe in return. This paper has looked
specifically at the U.S.-Japan relationship in the context of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in
order to understand the dynamics of these types of alliances, specifically the deterrent
strategies that influence foreign relations, the inherent concerns on both sides of the
alliance, and what needs to be done for the future to simultaneously deter U.S. foes and
reassure U.S. allies.
However, the U.S. and Japan are not in a vacuum. Nuclear weapons-related
diplomatic and military efforts with China, South Korea, and North Korea all have
important influences on the U.S.-Japan alliance, and will remain key factors during the
ongoing U.S. nuclear modernization.
China-U.S. relations regarding nuclear weapons play an important role due to the
fact that they are extremely limited. China seems to be sticking to its “lean and effective”
nuclear posture, which aims to keep a small, manageable force that can both deter
potential nuclear attacks and reduce the effectiveness of nuclear intimidation.187 This is
promising for the U.S. and its allies, who are extremely concerned about a rising China,
especially with its formidable economy and modernizing military. Nonetheless, China
has also refused to engage in bilateral military-to-military discussions on nuclear
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weapons with the U.S., dissuading attempts from both the George W. Bush and Obama
Administrations. The U.S. would benefit from these talks in two major ways. First, they
would allay U.S. concerns about the trajectory of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, so the U.S.
could make better decisions about military investments and provide reassurance for its
allies, namely Japan.188 Second, the U.S. would use the talks to understand Chinese
concerns, so that it can avoid or minimize potentially controversial policies while also
preventing Beijing from adopting a reactionary approach to its nuclear forces. Neither of
these objectives, however, can be achieved without engaging China in some sort of
dialogue, which it has rejected on multiple occasions. The lack of communication
between the U.S. and China on nuclear weapons issues creates uncertainties and
speculation, which in turn can lead to potentially dangerous policy misinterpretations, not
only by the two nuclear powers but also by non-nuclear allies like Japan, which already
have a list of concerns when it comes to China. The U.S. has to keep China in mind when
crafting its modernization strategy, or else there could be serious tensions that push Japan
into a threatened position, which threatens the bilateral alliance.
Meanwhile, South Korea provides its own unique influence on the U.S.-Japan
bilateral security relationship due to its rival status as another recipient of U.S. extended
nuclear deterrence, as well as its controversial relations with Japan. In addition to
competing for U.S. nuclear attention, South Korea and Japan are also competing in their
own territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the Sea of Japan. South
Koreans have ongoing suspicions of Japan that prevent ample diplomatic progress; for
example, in May and June 2012 a bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement, which the U.S.
hoped would improve trilateral coordination on security issues, fell through at the last
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minute because South Korea withdrew its signature.189 Furthermore, South Korea, unlike
Japan, views China as a valuable ally and partner rather than an “existential challenge
and territorial threat,” particularly because it needs Chinese support when dealing with
North Korea.190 These conflicting demands, perspectives, and priorities could be
detrimental to the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance and nuclear weapons issues. The
U.S. has to choose, for example on concerns related to China, whether to yield to
Japanese fears or South Korean confidence; and no matter which one it selects, the
unselected ally will automatically feel shunned, an unhelpful attitude for building trust in
an alliance involving nuclear weapons.
North Korea is the final piece of the East Asian regional puzzle. While it serves as
“one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold
War period,” North Korea also has the potential as the hostile state to bring allied
countries together like no diplomatic summit ever could. Its provocations have actually
led Japan and South Korea into some bilateral breakthroughs, as well as improved
trilateral relations with the U.S., the Perry diplomatic process after the 1998 Taepodong
launch being a perfect example.191 Both the U.S. and Japan want to maximize their
relations with North Korea, despite the lack of diplomatic normalization between any of
these countries. At the same time, Japan is painfully aware of the dangers from being so
close in proximity to the North Korea’s budding nuclear program, and the U.S. is
painfully aware of its commitment to deter North Korean nuclear attacks on Japan. How
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North Korea acts over the upcoming years, then, will be yet another factor in determining
the credibility and quality of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance.
China, South Korea, and North Korea each contribute their own special
circumstances and interests to the extended nuclear deterrent relationship between the
U.S. and Japan. So far, however, the bilateral alliance is looking strong. Increased U.S.Japanese communication efforts help to ease some of the regional tensions, and active
security attitudes on both sides allow for more productive dialogue on crucial nuclear
weapons issues, including nuclear modernization. As long as these positive developments
are cultivated and expanded upon, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to be a
cornerstone of U.S. East Asia policy for many more years.
Nuclear weapons have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it. But with
the right amount of good diplomacy, calculated military strategy, and common sense, the
U.S. just might be able to use them to leverage a lasting peace.
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